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Moral Foundations Theory uses a taxonomy of five moral foundations to categorise 
individuals. The Moral Foundations Hypothesis (MFH) (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) 
predicts that individuals identifying as politically liberal will be more concerned with the 
individualising foundations of Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity than the binding 
foundations of Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Subversion and Purity/Sanctity. It also predicts 
that those identifying as politically conservative will be evenly concerned with all five 
foundations, while simultaneously showing more concern for the three binding foundations 
than liberals. This relationship can be assessed, as is the case in the current study, using the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire, a descriptive measure of morality (Graham et al., 2009). 
This study sought to establish whether the prediction made by the MFH would be supported 
using a large sample (N = 1261) gathered through the online Facebook research application 
myPersonality.org. Several different statistical strategies were used to test the hypothesis: 
pre-registered structural equation modelling (including confirmatory factor analysis); case-
based analysis; exploratory correlational analysis, and exploratory factor analysis. Results of 
the analysis did not support the predictions of the MFH. The confirmatory models did not 
reach acceptable levels of fit, based on the fit index thresholds set in the study preregistration. 
However, the regression estimates from the Structural Equation Model were in the predicted 
directions. Additionally, the exploratory case-based analysis revealed tentative support for the 
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There has been a dramatic increase in research in moral psychology over the past 
couple of decades, propelling the field into becoming a significant part of modern 
psychological science. The current study is an attempt to solidify theory and progress the 
field through replication using empirical data. The study is situated within the framework of 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) and specifically addresses the Moral Foundations 
Hypothesis (MFH). MFT is a descriptive model, proposed by Graham et al. (2013, 2018), and 
characterises an individual’s moral beliefs. Derived from factor analyses, the model’s current 
structure places individuals on spectrums of five foundations, which each represent a 
different facet of morality (Graham et al., 2013); detailed in Chapter 2 of this review. The 
MFH makes a specific claim that individuals who identify as politically liberal have different 
moral motivations and beliefs than those who identify as politically conservative; detailed in 
Chapter 3. The present research aims to assess the current thinking in this area by replicating 
the findings from Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009). It will attempt this by applying the same 
statistical technique used by these researchers in the form of a latent variable model, to a 
previously unused, large, existing data set. 
 
This literature review is separated into six chapters:  
 
Chapter 1: will discuss the state of modern moral psychology. The most relevant theories 
will be assessed to set the context for the current study. 




Chapter 3: will focus on the political divide of liberals and conservatives. This will be 
analysed mostly as a function of the different moralities observed in these groups. The Moral 
Foundations Hypothesis will also be explained here. 
Chapter 4: will assess the structure and validity of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
(MFQ). This is the measure used in the current research and the most prominent tool in the 
study of morality in psychology.  
Chapter 5: will discuss the myPersonality.org project and the origins of the existing dataset 
used in this study. It will also address social media research in general and whether it is a 
good source of data. 
Chapter 6: will discuss the current study; making a note on the reproducibility crisis in 
psychology, discuss structural equation modelling, the statistical technique used for the 
analysis in this research, and end the literature review with a description of the research 
















Chapter 1: Current State of Moral Psychology 
 
It is important to address some of the popular theories of morality and assess their 
relevance to the current research. This is also useful in grounding moral foundations theory 
(MFT) and the moral foundations hypothesis (MFH) within the current thinking on morality 
in general. When discussing morality in a psychological context, we are talking about the 
beliefs, ideas, and values about others and the world that motivate an individuals’ actions and 
opinions. The main goal of moral psychology researchers is to attempt to explain how and 
why individuals behave in line with specific moral values. Most theories in the field are 
descriptive, attempting to explain behaviour, rather than normative, making specific claims 
about how individuals should behave (Haidt, 2012). One of the recent trends in psychology is 
to situate behaviour or specific findings in a neurobiological context; usually using functional 
magnetic resonance imagery (fMRI). However, there does not currently appear to be a 
specific area of the brain dedicated to moral thinking; morality seems rather to be an 
amalgamation of many different processes at work, such as risk analysis, imagination of 
outcomes of behaviour, tracking of others thoughts (e.g. theory of mind), and beliefs, among 
others (Greene, 2014; Ruff & Fehr, 2014; Young & Dungan, 2012). While neurobiological 
evidence will be referenced, since this evidence is at such a transition phase, it is more 
relevant and useful to deal mainly with the cognitive and behavioural aspects of morality, 
which the current review will do.  
How to define morality and moral judgement is still debated in the field. A distinction 
is made by some moral psychology researchers between moral judgements and conventional 
judgements (Turiel, 2018; Killen & Dahl, 2018); whereby moral judgements concern issues 
of fairness, welfare/harm, and rights, as opposed to conventional judgements which consider 
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authority, rules, and social traditions. While this separation of moral and conventional 
judgements was common in moral psychology in the mid to late stages of the twentieth 
century, it is significantly different to MFT (Haidt & Graham, 2009); which encompasses all 
of these under the umbrella of moral foundations. Prominent moral theorists Turiel (2018) 
and Killen and Dahl (2018) seem to discount aspects of morality which are critically 
important to eastern cultures and conservative westerners. not deeming them worthy of being 
included as being morally relevant. MFT also emphasises the importance of innate structure 
predisposed to develop moral reasoning, which is also contested. Killen and Dahl (2018) 
claim morality arises solely from social interaction and cognitive reflection, a constructivist 
model. It is difficult to interpret the distinction here, as both social interaction and cognitive 
processes arise due to evolutionary and biological predisposition, basically making the 
argument that morality is formed through social interaction and cognitive reflection alone 
redundant. There are two recent intriguing variations on the structure of moral judgement that 
are worth extrapolating at this point: the parallel morality hypothesis (PMH) (van den Bos, 
2018), and person-centred morality (PCM) (Landy & Uhlmann, 2018).  
The PMH proposes that, rather than deliberate reasoning following slowly after 
intuition, as in the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001), which will be discussed in chapter 
2, these processes work alongside each other to form moral judgement (van den Bos, 2018). 
It is similar to the dual process model (Green, 2007), however the relationship between the 
two processes are more mutually compatible in PMH, rather than combative as in the dual 
process model. In this manner, intuitive thinking is not left to its own devices in the moment; 
rather it is reined in by concordant complex reasoning. Two systems are at work in the brain; 
they are operating independently, allowing for simultaneous function (Strack & Deutsch, 
2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). This assertion is supported by neurobiological 
evidence: Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, and Fehr (2006) observed that impaired 
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functioning of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), achieved through transcranial 
magnetic stimulation, resulted in a reduction in individuals’ willingness to reject unfair offers 
in an ultimatum game; suggesting a significant amount of cognitive control is necessary for 
judgements of fairness. A more practical example of this parallel operation could be the case 
of self-interest versus fairness; whereby self-interest is automatic and enticing; while 
appreciation of fairness is a slower, thoughtful process (Moore & Loewenstein, 2004). This 
would generally only be relevant in situations concerning the individual, not others.  
Taking a different approach, Person-Centred Morality focuses more on the 
motivations of moral judgement. Landy and Uhlmann (2018) argue that judgements are more 
about assessing people themselves, rather than actions. This is achieved through nuanced 
automatic judgements of character, followed by deliberate analysis of an individual's 
character, which can alter the original automatic assessment (Landy and Uhlmann, 2018). 
Virtue ethics, assessing character and goodness as opposed to the ‘right’ action such as this, 
originated with the thinking of Aristotle (Aristotle, trans. 1998). Temporally speaking, it is 
constructed very similarly to the Social Intuitionist Model; intuitions first, deliberate 
reasoning second (Haidt, 2001). Important to note, Landy and Uhlmann (2018) identify 
trustworthiness and compassion as core elements of good character. There is also evidence 
that assessment of character is an innate skill in humans. Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom (2007) 
observed that infants of only 6 months showed a preference, in the form of looking 
behaviour, for helping characters over hindering characters. Adults will even make 
judgements of aggression and trustworthiness after seeing a face displayed for only 100 
milliseconds (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Studies by Goodwin, Piazza and Rosen (2014) using 
obituaries in newspapers have shown that people attend more to moral attributes of others, 
even when presented with more information about their abilities and achievements. The 
evidence for person-centred morality has been building in recent years: a pre-publication 
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independent replication project undertaken by Schweinsberg et al. (2016) demonstrated 
consistent reproducibility of the effects of person-centred morality. While individuals vary in 
how they judge values, the roots of these judgements, their personal morality, is critical to 
how their identity is defined. 
An interesting insight into the development of morality comes from evolutionary 
biology, claiming that animals must be able to track one another's actions in order to set in 
motion the construction of morals; reciprocal altruism comes from this ability, as individuals 
can distinguish who to help (Trivers, 1971). Building on this, Strohminger, (2018) notes that 
moral continuity appears to be one of the driving forces of diachronic (developing and 
evolving over time) identity. She goes on to extend this to how we judge others; contending 
that essentialism allows humans to see underlying and hidden characteristics, which are then 
applied when assessing the progression of an individual's identity over time. When allowing 
for the possible existence of a soul, participants in multiple studies were more likely to 
suggest moral traits when asked what parts of a person would remain if their soul were to 
transfer to another body (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). This effect held for U.S participants, 
Hindu Indians, and even Buddhists (Garfield, Nichols, Rai, & Strominger, 2015). These 
effects indicate that individuals acknowledge morality as a permanent and structural piece of 
a person, more important than their other traits. Moral beliefs are even seen as the most 
important aspect of identity in late childhood. 8-10-year olds said a pill altering moral beliefs 
would change an individual more than other traits or preferences (Heiphetz, Strohminger, 
Young, & Gelman, 2016). Most interestingly, Strohminger (2018) found that patients 
suffering from frontotemporal dementia, which in early to middle stages impairs moral 
thinking, are seen as losing more of their identity by family members than those with more 
memory-based impairments, like Alzheimer's dementia (Strohminger, 2018). Again, morality 
is seen here as fundamental to identity. It is curious that even when people may not recognise 
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their family, the family are comforted by their loved one remaining themselves, in moral 
terms at least. On a similar note to Strohminger; Conway (2018) sees moral self-perception 
and social perception as the crucial drivers of morality; including judgements, behaviour, and 
decision making.  
Moral self-perceptions are relative, in the sense that they are formed not just by how 
an individual sees themselves, but how they think others see them, and how they judge others 
(Conway, 2018). In this manner it is as much group-focused/defined as individually. These 
ideas are part of moral self-theory (MST): a functionalist and integrative model (Conway, 
2018). Research has demonstrated that individuals with a stronger sense of moral identity, 
defined by scores on the Moral Identity Scale, are more likely to want to avoid harm to 
others, but also maximise group outcomes (Conway and Gawronski, 2013), somewhat 
bridging the individualist-collectivist gap. Priming moral identity has been shown to 
influence prosocial behaviour by predicting everyday task behaviour and actively increasing 
prosocial acts (Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; Hoffman, Wisnecki, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014). 
This moral identity priming has also been shown to reduce immoral behaviour like cheating 
(Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2013). The practical elements of this research complement 
Strohminger (2018) effectively and would be useful as a combined theoretical construct. The 
use of moral identity naturally extends to the political realm, relevant to the current study. 
Van Zant and Moore (2015) found that people prefer political policies that are supported by a 
moral argument. Of course, it is important to remember that this style of argument has limits, 
as voters can become cynical of the motivations of politicians, not trusting that the sentiment 
is genuinely morally motivated. Alternately, people are also more likely to express their 
thoughts freely when an issue is moralised (Effron & Miller, 2013). Perhaps this is a reason 
why the partisan divide is so visceral; every political issue in the modern landscape can be 
linked to each side’s values and moral beliefs, invoking voter’s individual moral identity and 
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forcing them to fight for their moral-selves constantly (Andris et al., 2015; Abramowitz & 
Webster, 2018). Political groups can often become literally distant groups, with more rurally 
located people identifying as more conservative and those in highly populated urban areas as 
more liberal (Haidt, 2012). This can create fundamentally different ways is which we see 
each other. 
Waytz and Young (2018) propose that moral cognition is applied in fundamentally 
different ways towards those who are close to the individual versus those who are distant. 
They see theory of mind as the key to conceptualising others morality; viewing others as 
moral actors and assessing whether they are friend or foe. Rather than simply judging an 
individual on their actions, a more complete assessment of their mental state is required 
(Waytz & Young, 2018). An us versus them dynamic is created through this variation in 
moral cognition. Specifically, the authors claim that individuals focus more on purity and 
loyalty when assessing close others; while focusing on harm and fairness when assessing 
distant others. This type of variation in cognition would likely occur when liberals are 
assessing fellow liberals versus conservatives, and vice versa. Studies conducted by Waytz 
and Young (2014; 2018) supported the idea that distant others are seen as moral agents 
responsible for their actions, as opposed to close others having actions done to them, moral 
patients. Waytz, Young, and Ginges (2014) assessed the motivations of conflict in groups of 
American democrats/republicans, and Israelis/Palestinians: all four groups saw their own side 
(ingroup) as motivated by love for their ingroup, but saw their opposing side (outgroup) as 
motivated by hate for them. These variations have also been observed for other moral 
foundations. Duncan, Chakroff, and Young (2017) found that individuals judged their own 
group more harshly on issues involving purity, while judging their outgroup more harshly on 
harm violations. In this manner, morality gains its real-world meaning through interaction 
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with others. This leads into another recent model: side-taking theory (DeScioli & Kurzban, 
2018). 
DeScioli and Kurzban (2018) see moral judgement as evolving from the need to 
choose sides during conflict. Side-taking theory allows for the development of new moral 
rules/beliefs in response to new sources of conflict. The theorists acknowledge that moral 
cognition is therefore seen as universal, with variations in moral rules across cultures/groups. 
Side-taking theory also holds that moral judgement is largely unconscious and then motivated 
to persuade others to agree and be part of the same side. There does appear to be some 
support for this view in past literature. Theories of morality, such as those based on 
cooperation and/or reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971; de Waal, 1996; Wright, 1994) are often 
predicated on moral judgement leading to increase in welfare, however severe punishment is 
often sought for those supposedly breaking moral rules. The dominant side reacts to threats to 
their moral thinking, judging in the way they see as morally consistent. Blasphemy, 
homosexuality, and premarital sex appear on the surface to be harmless offences, despite still 
being punishable by death in some societies (Appiah, 2010: Sarhan & Burke, 2009). For 
extreme binding cultures (i.e. those that are highly concerned with authoritarian societal 
structures and spiritual purity) these are not seen as harmless and violations must be dealt 
with in order to maintain continuity in their moral structure (Haidt, 2012). Sides are often 
defined by hierarchy, with the few who are in charge being arbiters of the public moral will. 
This could be applied to the modern westernised political divide, as individuals progressively 
feel tied to their side and vociferously defend it. Side taking theory seems insufficient 
however to explain moral judgement in its entirety. This is particularly true in the cases of 
moral judgment in young children (Bloom, 2013) who have no concept of assessing which 
side is best to join and defend. Clearly with the depth of current research, descriptive claims 
of morality are far from settled. The current study utilises the framework of moral 
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foundations theory to attempt to move the field forward. The following chapter will explain 










Moral foundations theory (MFT) is a pluralistic model of human morality. It consists 
of a multi-factor structure which can be applied to an individual to make a descriptive claim 
about how their moral beliefs can be defined. MFT has roots in three separate fields: 
evolutionary psychology, cultural anthropology, and social psychology, specifically, what is 
known as the automaticity revolution, a term that refers to the increase in research identifying 
automatic cognitive responses (i.e. intuitive and not controlled by deliberate conscious 
mechanisms) (Graham, Haidt, Motyl, Meindl, & Moojiman, 2018). It also draws directly 
from three previous theories: Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park’s (1997) three ethics; 
Fiske’s (1992) four models of sociality; and Schwartz’s (1992) ten value types. Most early 
moral psychology theories were individualist and dominated by Western ideology. The 
focused on harm, individual rights, and justice, or care and compassion (Kohlberg, 1969; 
Turiel, 1983; Gilligan, 1982; Hoffman, 1982). It wasn’t until the work of Shweder and 
colleagues (2008; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) that the moral realm was 
extended to encompass foundations important to Eastern and collectivist cultures. Shweder et 
al. (1997) proposed three ethics, which were termed the three moral languages of the world: 
autonomy, which encompasses concerns of harms, rights and justice; community, relating to 
loyalty and duty; and divinity, representing the spiritual and divine, including purity and the 
sanctity of the body. Alan Fiske’s (1991) four relational models of social relationships are: 
communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching, and authority ranking. While 
Schwartz's (1992) ten values types are: benevolence, universalism, self-direction, security, 
conformity, hedonism, achievement, tradition, stimulation, and power. MFT does not directly 
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reconcile these taxonomies as they are motivated by different concepts: discourse for 
Shweder, relationships for Fiske, and motivations for Shwartz. Instead, it utilises the 
evolutionary psychology progress guided by Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (1992), and 
forms a separate, overarching theory of morality. In this manner, MFT brings the fields 
together without eliminating the original intent of each theory. Many monist theories, which 
seek to define a concept based on a single source, have come before, boiling morality down 
to a single element. For Kohlberg (1971), this was justice. For others, including current 
theorists, it is harm or wellbeing (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Harris, 2010). The authors of 
MFT see this as an unnecessary simplification of morality. Aristotle is perhaps one of the 
earliest influential pluralists, but more recently was Carol Gilligan (1982), who challenged 
Kohlberg and his followers, contending that care should be considered separate to justice. 
This resulted in debates in the literature which left a lasting mark on the landscape of moral 
psychology. Kohlberg eventually conceded that the two exist and are distinct (Kohlberg, 
Levine, & Hewer, 1983). It is important that the literature can sometimes move forward in an 
agreed direction, rather than constant disagreement, whereby the field makes no progress. 
The level of appreciation and incorporation of evolutionary theory sets MFT apart in the 




There are four main underlying theoretical networks, upon which MFT is structured: 
nativism, cultural learning, intuitionism, and pluralism (Graham et al., 2018). Theoretical 
networks in this context are the empirical findings which have been linked together to form a 
wider theory. Each of these make an individual claim central to the conceptualisation of 
MFT. First, and most important for positioning the theory, is nativism, which proposes that 
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the ability to use moral thinking is innate, and a first draft of the moral mind was provided by 
the stresses and adaptation of human evolution (Graham et al., 2018). The first draft 
metaphor is useful here in emphasising the idea that the parts of the brain responsible for 
moral thinking will later be edited and significantly changed. An early example of 
predisposition to moral thinking comes from developmental psychology. Very young 
children exhibit pleasure in response to fairness, then conversely exhibit displeasure in 
response to unfairness (Tooby, Cosmides, & Barrett, 2005). It could be argued that this is 
merely a cultural response to learned ideas of fairness, however, similar responses are seen in 
infants as young as 6 months (Bloom, 2013), not yet capable of such complex understanding 
of their external world. Evolutionary theorists have long argued that cognitive adaptations 
have emerged in response to historical pressures and opportunities that humans have faced 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Pinker, 1997). Haidt (2007) then made the link between these 
adaptations and innate structures of moral thinking. While nativism may create the first draft, 
cultural learning provides the bulk of the story. 
Cultural learning is the idea that experience in one's culture edits and develops the 
innate moral potential of the mind (Graham et al., 2018). It is through this learning process 
that moral minds become culturally specific e.g. emphasis of individual rights and freedoms 
in California, U.S.A, versus strict respect for patriarchal hierarchy in rural China. Cultural 
learning provides additional evidence for nativism as well. Despite the obvious differences, 
remarkable similarities in morality arise universally, evidenced by the same foundational 
concerns across cultures (Haidt, 2012). It also demonstrates that if learning did not take place, 
then all cultures would be identical, driven only by their evolutionary draft (Haidt, Koller, & 
Dias, 1993; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). Sperber (2005) sees many of the cognitive 
modules created through evolution as learning modules, primed to develop and multiply, 
depending on experience. Graham et al. (2013) see this as an effective explanation of the 
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impact of cultural learning on nativist modules like preparedness (Seligman, 1971). An 
example of this learning process can be seen in greetings, with kisses on each cheek in France 
compared to the embrace and hongi of traditional Māori New Zealanders. Both become 
automatic and ingrained behaviours, performing similar functions, but manifest differently. 
Nativism and cultural learning provide the explanation for the construction of moral thinking, 
while intuitionism focuses on the process of moral judgement itself. 
Intuitionism is the view that moral judgement is guided first by intuitions and later 
followed by slower deliberate reasoning, often post-hoc rationalisation, known as the social 
intuitionist model (SIM) (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2012). These automatic responses to actions or 
individuals often rely on heuristics, thinking rules of thumb, and are fast effortless processes 
sometimes referred to as system 1 thinking (Kahneman, 2011; Haidt, 2012). System 2 is then 
the slower, conscious and more complex processes, utilising the prefrontal cortex 
(Kahneman, 2011). In this model, moral judgement is heavily influenced by affective 
responses over conscious reasoning (Haidt, 2001). It is important to note, however, that the 
SIM does not disregard deliberate reasoning, rather seeing deliberate reasoning as socially 
motivated and used to justify or rationalise judgements and arguments (Haidt, 2012). Moral 
reasoning is then seen as motivated (Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009). MFT seeks to 
explain why these intuitions occur in response to such specific situations/stimuli. Certain 
psychologists, most notably Greene and colleagues (2008), disagree with the dominance of 
affect-laden intuitions over deliberate moral reasoning. They propose that the two are locked 
in a constant battle within the brain, what they term the dual process model. Greene notes, 
however, that in emotionally salient situations, the affect-laden intuitions often drive 
reasoning. Multiple critiques of intuitionism have also come from developmental psychology, 
noting the lack of appreciation for the development of moral reasoning over an individual's 
life, which can alter how intuitions manifest (Navarez, 2010; Bloom, 2010). Graham et al. 
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(2013) welcome this critique and agree that moral development should be incorporated more 
in MFT. Finally, pluralism acknowledges that there are multiple different foundations that 
make up morality, not just one, as in the case of moral monistic theories (Kohlberg, 1969; 
Turiel, 1983). MFT sees each of the foundations as interrelated but unique adaptations to 
evolutionary pressure on humans. Graham et al. (2013) are confident in their belief that more 
than five foundations exist, however the following are the five with the best current empirical 
evidence. The bulk of this evidence, which will be discussed in detail further on, comes from 
the divide between political liberals and conservatives in terms of foundation concerns, the 
focus of the current study. In this framework, each foundation represents a portion of an 
individual’s morality, with each attempting to describe certain motivations for reasoning and 
judgement. Each foundation has been shown to have evolutionary and biological roots 




1. Harm/Care: represents aversion to harm from others and caring for others. This 
foundation originates from the lengthy period in which mammals, humans in 
particular, are dependent upon their caregivers (Graham et al., 2018). Caring for the 
needs of offspring meant they were more likely to survive and reproduce, and this 
care gradually extended to our wider kin groups and communities. It is clear from the 
intuitive response of mothers across all species, that some form of innate preparedness 
is present and can’t simply be learned each generation.  
2. Fairness/Reciprocity/Cheating: a desire for fairness and aversion to cheating is 
present across all cultures and occurs in children at a very young age, less than one 
year old in some studies (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; LoBue, Chiong, Nishida, 
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Deloache, & Haidt, 2011). This is perhaps best understood as what Trivers (1971) 
termed reciprocal altruism. He explains that individuals care and provide for others in 
exchange for the same treatment, while those who cheat the system are identified and 
struggle to reproduce. Fairness reactions are pervasive in our lives, e.g. anger at 
hearing of a favourite sports player using performance enhancing drugs, or even at an 
ATM machine for confiscating your credit card. Fairness also presents a curious case 
for variance within the foundation. Higher levels of fairness concern are invoked in 
political liberals vs. conservatives depending on situation (Haidt, 2012).  
3. Ingroup/Loyalty/Betrayal: defines the level of affiliation and loyalty felt for one’s 
group, whatever that group may be. Ingroups and outgroups arose due to the constant 
competition for finite resources (Dawkins, 1989). Groups that could work together 
most efficiently survived, and the sense of loyalty within groups grew (Graham et al., 
2013). It is astutely observable in the coalitions seen within chimpanzees as they 
compete for territory and rank within their area (de Waal, 1982). Human history 
paints a picture of tribes, then societies, then countries, fighting for resources and 
territory. The most cohesive and loyal forming lasting empires e.g. Greece, Rome, the 
U.S.A. These loyalty intuitions can be seen all around the modern world in various 
forms: strident sports team support, patriotism, willingness to join armed forces. It can 
also be the basis of racism and wider discrimination when outgroups are treated as the 
dangerous other. 
4. Authority/Respect/Subversion: under this foundation we can observe how much an 
individual is willing to conform to authority and respect system rules. Hierarchies are 
present across all primates, usually defined by physical dominance, however more 
likely wealth and power in humans (Boehm, 1997; de Waal 1996). Groups with 
strong leadership and stable hierarchies have tended to succeed over history far better 
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than more anarchic or tyrannical social structures (Pfeiffer, 1998; Sherif, 1961). Those 
individuals who don't respect the hierarchy or seek to undermine it are punished. 
Again, this is observable in chimpanzee and bonobo populations. The primates more 
innately ready to form the kind of necessary relationships and navigate hierarchical 
structures are more likely to learn and survive than those less capable and relying 
solely on general intelligence (de Waal, 1982; Fisk, 1991). Authority systems are 
treated differently depending on culture (e.g. conservatives have higher respect for the 
police and military in the U.S than liberals) (Haidt & Graham, 2009).  
5. Purity/Sanctity/Degradation: this final foundation addresses individual concerns for 
bodily and spiritual cleanliness. It is strongly associated with the universal emotion of 
disgust, proposed to evolve from the need to avoid pathogens and harmful 
contaminants to the body (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Human evolution 
encountered many variations in diet due to shifts in territory and eating strategies. 
Naturally, those most adept at avoiding illness, or with better immune systems, were 
more likely to survive and reproduce (Schaller & Park, 2011). In much the same way 
as loyalty has generalised, disgust has been shown to manifest as a social protection, 
inducing fear and avoidance of unfamiliar and potentially impure others e.g. 
LGBTQIA individuals or different ethnicities (Schaller & Park, 2011; Inbar, Pizzaro, 
Knobe, & Bloom, 2009). Alternately, many cultures hold the sanctity of the body, i.e. 
treating the body as a temple, in very high moral regard (Graham et al., 2018).   
 
Importantly, there are observable differences across people and cultures. Graham et al. 
(2011), utilising large international samples, observed that world region, after controlling for 
other demographic variables, was a reliable predictor of scores on concerns of moral 
foundations. The authors noted that Eastern cultures e.g. South, East and South-East Asia 
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consistently showed more concern for loyalty/ingroup and sanctity/purity than did Western 
cultures e.g. the U.S, Canada, and the U.K. Interestingly, these differences were smaller than 
that between conservatives and liberals within the U.S, which conforms to the literature 
supporting greater within-culture differences than between cultures (Vauclair & Fischer, 
2011). Historic prevalence of pathogen levels has even been shown to predict not only levels 
of concern for purity, but also ingroup and authority (van Leeuwen, Koenig, Graham, & Park, 
2014). van Leeuwen and Park (2009) have also replicated the difference in moral foundations 
of liberals and conservatives in a Dutch sample. Cultures and individuals tend to feel 
threatened by conflicting moral beliefs structures (Kesebir & Pyszczynksi, 2011; 
Pyszczynski, Motyl, & Abdollahi, 2009). It may be natural then that the partisan divide has 
become so pronounced (Andris et al., 2015; Abramowitz & Webster, 2018; Iyengar & 
Krupenkin, 2018) in the digital age as everyone has become aware of each other’s views. 
People are often unable to even fathom that others could hold the opposing view to their own 
(Ditto & Koleva, 2011).  
 
MFT factor structure in New Zealand 
 
Some of the more recent research into the MFT factor structure has come out of New 
Zealand. Davis, Sibley, and Liu (2014) used a large New Zealand-based sample to test the 
factor structure of MFT using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire. They tested the five-
factor model of MFT against multiple other options: single factor, two factor, three factor, 
and a hierarchical model consisting of the five foundations nestled within two second order 
factors (individualising and binding). The original five-factor model proved to be the best fit 
after a confirmatory factor analysis. While the overall model fit indices were weaker than 
desired, this is explained by the authors as due to the complexity of testing morality; the same 
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argument made by Graham et al. (2009). Interestingly, the authors tested whether the model 
fit held across genders, which it did. Contrary to Graham et al. (2009; 2011), Davis et al. 
(2014) did not find moderate-strong negative relationships between conservatism and the 
individualising foundations (Harm and Fairness). This indicates that the relationship between 
political ideology and moral foundation scores may be different to what the MFT authors 
claim. Davis et al. (2014) put this down to either a potential conceptual difference between 
liberal and conservative in NZ, or a national identity of equality and fairness. 
Other potential foundations currently being studied and considered for induction into 
MFT include liberty/oppression, equity/undeservingness, and honesty/lying (Graham, et al., 
2018). As these are not yet confirmed as foundations in the model, they will not be discussed 
further. MFT is not universally accepted, and the next section will discuss critiques and 
opposing theories and models of morality. 
 
Opposing Monistic Theories 
 
Dyadic Morality Theory (DMT) proposes that the pluralism presented in MFT can be 
explained solely by concerns of harm (Gray & Keeney, 2015; Shein & Gray, 2015). DMT 
suggests that all moral judgement accesses the same underlying process, viewing moral 
situations as a case of how an individual moral agent’s unique cognitive template is causing 
harm to a moral patient (Gray and Keeney, 2015). In this context, a moral agent is performing 
an action, while the moral patient is an individual being acted upon. DMT seeks to portray 
MFT as a set of unrelated domain-specific foundations, however this is not the case as the 
foundations are developmentally constructed and edited by experience, therefore all related as 
part of the moral mind (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). The most effective argument for DMT came 




Critique from Gray and Keeney (2015) 
 
Gray and Keeney (2015) claim that sampling bias, in the form of stimuli confounds, is 
the cause of differences observed in moral judgments across the foundations of MFT, rather 
than genuine moral differences. They contend that the context of moral scenarios commonly 
used in MFT studies are merely confounded by levels of weirdness and severity. MFT is a 
modular theory, stating that distinct modules or foundations exist based on moral content of 
actions/thoughts (Gray and Keene, 2015). Domain-general accounts alternatively, reject this 
idea and emphasise an overarching cognitive and affective function which guides moral 
judgement (Cameron, Lundquist, & Gray, 2015). In their critique of MFT, Gray and Keeney 
(2015) focus on the differences, or lack thereof, between the foundations of harm and 
impurity. They see impurity examples such as eating a pet dog as fundamentally weirder than 
harm violations like direct violence. Strange behaviours are also more likely to invoke 
judgements of an individual's character or disposition, rather than the act itself or extraneous 
situational influences (Pizzaro & Tannenbaum, 2011). Severity levels are also seen as critical 
to the argument. More severe acts are commonly seen as more immoral, so they are likely to 
be judged as representing more intention (Murphy, 2004). Moreover, harm violations often 
appear more severe (e.g. murder vs. eating out of the garbage), so are likely to be judged as 
such. Gray and Keeney (2015) ran three studies to assess whether weirdness and severity do 
indeed confound the differences between harm and purity. In study 1, participants judged 
previously used MFT scenarios: impurity scenarios were rated less severe and weirder, while 
harm scenarios were rated more harmful and even more impure (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 
2012). Study 2 compared scenarios from MFT with ones generated by participants 
themselves. The authors note that the purity violations generated by participants didn’t 
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include anything like the weird examples used in MFT studies. However, this is precisely the 
point of many purity scenarios. They are rated as impure, but participants struggle to explain 
why. Participant-produced examples from this study like prostitution and child molestation 
(Gray and Keeney, 2015) are easily argued against. In the results of study 2, MFT scenarios 
were seen as less severe overall, most notably the impurity scenarios, and weirder overall, 
again mostly the impurity examples. Interestingly, ratings of harm and purity were also 
highly correlated in both studies 1 and 2 (Gray and Keeney, 2015). Finally, study 3 assessed 
the link between harm and acts, and purity and character. The authors found that 
manipulating weirdness and severity, rather than moral content, did indeed predict ratings of 
acts and character. They claim that the variations in liberal and conservative responses may 
be down to context-specific scenarios, as conservatives are more sensitive to purity concerns 
around sex and religion, whereas liberals respond more to nutritional and environmental 
concerns (Graham et al., 2009; Feinberg & Willer, 2013).  
 
Graham’s (2015) Response 
 
Graham (2015), one of the most prominent theorists of MFT, began his response to 
Gray and Keeney (2015) by conceding that severity and typicality (weirdness) are indeed 
important factors in considering moral judgement, but refuted the claim that they explain the 
differences between harm and impurity. He notes that MFT does not claim that all 
foundations are equal in terms of severity, it goes so far as to expect this variation, 
particularly in the purity/degradation foundation. As a descriptive model, MFT does not make 
specific normative claims like equity of foundation severity. Addressing the very high 
correlation of harm and purity in studies 1 and 2 of Gray and Keeney (2015), Graham (2015) 
points out that self-report of how harmful or impure each violation is, is not an accurate 
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means to access intuitive concerns. He continues that there were also very high correlations 
between severity and harm (study 1, r=.93, study 2, r=.96) and severity and purity (study 1, 
r=.96, study 2, r=.97), making the comparisons with severity redundant. An interesting 
comparison would be measuring whether participants’ scores on harm concerns predicted 
their purity scores. Correlations of this in the literature are generally much lower (r=.06 for 
the MFQ; r=.35 for the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (MFSS); and r=.29 for the 
scenarios generated in study 2 of Gray and Keeney) (Graham, 2015; Graham & Haidt, 2012; 
Gray & Keeney, 2015). Graham (2015) claims that it appears Gray and Keeney go out of 
their way to select the weirdest impurity examples from MFT research, rather than using a 
complete validated set such as the MFQ or MFSS. He further notes that, in study 3, the use of 
adultery in the weirdness manipulation does not effectively separate harm from impurity, it 
was even acknowledged in the article that adultery crosses multiple foundations. It is also 
used in an ambiguous situation, which conflates adultery with sexual assault. Finally, he 
accepts that harm and purity do differ by severity and typicality, but these are merely two of 
the many ways they vary and are not disconfirming confounds.   
 
Evidence for Pluralism over Monism 
 
Monistic theories claim that purity is merely a distorted version of harm, however the 
evidence leans to the contrary. Purity/degradation concerns have been demonstrated to 
predict cultural and social issue attitudes (e.g. same-sex marriage, abortion, euthanasia) above 
and beyond harm concerns, other foundations, and demographic variables (Koleva, Graham, 
Haidt, Iyer, & Ditto, 2012). Purity concerns also predict, at a unique level, opinions on the 
environment, and stem cell research (Rottman, Kelemen, & Young, 2015; Clifford & Jerit, 
2013). One of the more notable examples of a need for a pluralistic view of morality comes 
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from a pair of studies by Rottman, Keleman, and Young (2014a; 2014b), in which judgement 
of suicide was predicted far more effectively by moral concerns around purity over harm. 
Purity appears in the literature to be the hallmark separator of pluralism from monism. Most 
of the argument for a pluralist view of morality stems from the vast amount of work done on 
the purity foundation. Exposure to similarities in purity concerns has even been shown to 
decrease social distancing (Deghani et al., 2016). The evidence for authority and ingroup 
concerns over harm, however, are not as obvious. Despite this, one strong example comes 
from Crone and Laham (2015), who observed a positive relationship between ingroup 
concerns and judgements of sacrifice, while also noting negative relationships between 
harm/purity and sacrifice judgements. This does tend to indicate a difference in the function 
of ingroup motivations versus harm and purity motivations. Graham et al (2018) themselves 
admit that limited work has been done to differentiate between authority and loyalty and 
separating all the wider foundations in judgement scenarios. This indicates some leeway in 
possibly changing the factor structure of MFT. The authors do, however, encourage this 
notion, supporting the method-theory co-development strategy (Graham et al., 2013). This 
means they are open to new measures and methods for testing current foundations and 
establishing new foundations. It is important to remember that MFT is a descriptive theory of 
morality, not a normative theory which claims how morality ought to be defined, so changing 
the structure is compatible. What is apparent from the literature on MFT is that while there is 
strong support for the five-foundation factor structure, there is space for refining the model.  
 Foundation differences can also have practical implications. For example, framing 
politically driven issues like the environment or health care in terms of purity concerns has 
been shown to reduce the partisan divide, with conservatives even endorsing liberal 
viewpoints (Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Feinberg & Willer, 2015). On a similar note, Haidt 
(2012) notes that republican politicians (who generally identify as being more conservative 
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than democrats) are far more adept than their democratic opponents at utilising moral 
arguments to sway votes. They are able to access not only the binding foundations but extend 
to harm and fairness, arguing against abortion in terms of killing innocent babies, or fairness 
with respect to paying less taxes, getting your fair share. Differences in reception of 
foundational concerns are also present in micro-facial expressions. Cannon, Schnall, & White 
(2011) observed distinct facial movements, representing affective responses, in participants 
listening to audio recordings of moral situations, an example being furrowing of the brows in 
anger in response to concerns for fairness versus wrinkling of the nose and upper lip in 
response to purity violations. There is certainly more evidence required for the other 
foundations, but the differences between harm and purity, and the individualising and binding 
foundations in general, indicates strong support for a pluralist conception of morality 
(Graham et al., 2018). One of the underlying ideals of pluralistic theories like MFT seems to 
be that parsimony is not worth falling short of complete understanding. This basically means 
that the simplest method is not always the best. The empirical advances in social and moral 
psychology begin to speak for themselves as to the value of MFT. Graham et al. (2013) see 
new data observed using validated MFT measurement tools as the path forward. The theory 
informs new measurements, followed by data informing the progression of the theory. The 
current study aims to add new evidence to this debate, providing large scale data for distinct 
groups (political liberals and conservatives) using the moral foundations questionnaire 
(MFQ). While MFT was not created for the purpose of assessing the differences between 
political conservatives and liberals, the foundational structure mapped on so effectively that 









Chapter 3: Liberals and Conservatives 
 
The Partisan Divide 
 
The political divide between those identifying as more liberal and those as more 
conservative has become a prevalent part of wider public discourse, not only in the political 
arena, evidenced by many research teams (see Andris et al., 2015; Abramowitz & Webster, 
2018; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). Often, decisions or proposals from a government are met 
with furious debate and visceral disdain for the opposing side from all parties. This is likely 
most pronounced in Western democratic societies, particularly the U.S., which value 
individualist ideas of culture (Heinrich & Norenzayan, 2010). While liberalism and 
conservatism are obviously not the only political positions for individuals to take (e.g. 
moderate, libertarian), they are a useful dichotomy for classifying large portions of the 
population. The current study uses this framework as it builds upon the work of Haidt (2007; 
2012) and Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009). Liberalism and conservatism, as concepts, have 
been a source of interest for psychological and philosophical literature for at least the last 
century. Classically speaking, individual liberty is the historical stalwart of liberal ideology, 
while conservatism stands as a positional ideology, protecting authority and institutions 
(Muller, 1997). While liberalism has generally taken a more optimistic view of the future of 
humanity, conservatism has been more pessimistic, concerned about the selfish and 
imperfectible qualities of humans (Graham et al. 2009). There are also notable personality 
differences: liberals are more open to new experience (McCrae, 1996), while conservatives 






In the modern world of social media and fervent ideological debate, it is entirely 
possible that the link between morality and political beliefs could be changing. One of the 
most interesting recent occurrences in the field of morality and political belief is the rise of 
identity politics, particularly on the left or liberal side of the political spectrum. This is most 
apparent in the U.S, which conveniently aligns with the dataset used in the current research. 
Francis Fukuyama (2018) sums up the forces on either side as a threat to the national identity 
of the U.S, specifically with those on the far right associated with white nationalism creating 
a narrative of national identity based on race and religion, while simultaneously those on the 
far left arguing that racism, victimisation, and discrimination are inherent to the structure of 
the U.S culture. Identity politics is a heated subject, so it is important to define what is meant 
by the term. The framework revolves around individuals being defined by their group 
identity, usually in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference (Furse-Roberts, 
2018). Many of the proponents seek to define politics, history, and sociological effects based 
on the conflicts between group identities throughout history. Individuals are distinguished, 
not by their similarities, a humanistic perspective, but more by their differences (Furse-
Roberts, 2018). Ironically, this could be seen as the antithesis of equality, which identity 
politics advocates claim to want. The movement most likely originated through the Frankfurt 
School Critical Theory, extending the oppressor-oppressed narrative of economic classes 
espoused by Karl Marx to include race, gender and social classes (Fukuyama, 2018). Furse-
Roberts (2018) sees the tribalism of identity politics as representing a group for many who do 
not have a clear marginalised identity of their own. This would be most obvious in the protest 
movements seen on University campuses in the U.S by white upper-middle class students 
(Haidt & Lukianoff, 2018). Despite its desire to support marginalised groups, identity politics 
can increase division and puts human dignity behind group identity. The increased 
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importance placed on human dignity, personal freedom, and a common humanity were a 
hallmark of enlightenment philosophers, and to an extent, Judaeo-Christian teachings (Furse-
Roberts, 2018). It is possible that the visceral reaction to supposed discrimination seen on 
social media and particularly within the younger generation has given rise to a new side to the 
Purity foundation of Moral Foundations Theory. This would need to be studied directly of 
course, but many of the reactions e.g. large scale public condemnation of perceived 
individual discrimination using social media such as Twitter.com (Stewart et al., 2019), are 
reminiscent of the emotional reactions to homosexuality and spiritual impurity observed in 
self-described conservatives (Inbar, Pizzaro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009). Social media itself has 
become a hotbed for political conflict and populist movements, which likely are shaping the 
wider landscape of politics and democracy. 
 
Social Media and Politics 
 
Social media has, in recent years, been used as a vessel for dissemination of targeted 
political views, most notably from Russian syndicates attempting to sow doubt in American 
democracy, often resulting in a high prevalence of misleading information within a news 
cycle, seeking to influence rather than inform (Crilley & Gillespie, 2019). Facebook's 
business model in particular allows for manipulation of user data to shape the views they are 
seeing, potentially shifting individual beliefs (Srnicek, 2016). 98 percent of Facebook 
revenue in 2018 came from targeted advertising alone (Crilley & Gillespie, 2018). The 
difficulty in distinguishing between advertising and real news is particularly concerning. 
Traditional journalism outlets have also become dependent on social media to spread their 
stories, leaving them vulnerable to manipulation. Print only newspapers have become an 
unsustainable business model and news organisations need to attract online viewers and 
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advertisers to sustain income. The speed required to release news over social media prevents 
proper editorial oversight and leads to a first-is-best mentality over facts-first (Hoskins & 
O’loughlin, 2015). Illegitimate news sources also undermine democratic politics in general, 
intentionally sowing doubt in democracy, and potentially distorting individuals understanding 
of their own political beliefs (Hoskins & O’loughlin, 2015). The result of this could be a 
misinterpretation of participant views on questionnaires attempting to measure political 
attitudes, and therefore warping predictive results on moral foundation scores on the MFQ. 
MFT and the MFH have presented a new way to frame the partisan divide and could be a 




The Moral Foundations Hypothesis 
 
Many previous moral psychology researchers have painted conservative motivations 
as immoral. Their opposition to social welfare programmes, same-sex rights, and many other 
issues have been seen as irrationally opposing the moral concerns of harm, justice, and 
individual rights. MFT however, demonstrates that this is an unfair and incomplete 
representation of conservative views and morality. Through the framework of MFT, the 
moral divide between liberals and conservatives is known as the Moral Foundations 
Hypothesis (MFH), which states: when considering moral decisions, liberals emphasise most 
prominently the foundations of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, while conservatives value 
all five equally, but emphasise the foundations of ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and 
purity/sanctity more than liberals (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The most important 
demarcation between liberal and conservative morality is that liberals emphasise 
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individualising foundations, while conservatives place equal concern in the collectivist 
binding and individualising foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Unfortunately, based on 
the narrow version of individual-focused morality, social justice research became a search for 
what was wrong with conservatives, determining what social conventions and prejudices they 
were employing, rather than merely trying to understand and validate their thinking (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007). The divide is plain to see in Academia currently. 
 
Bias in Academia 
 
Liberal leaning researchers dominate journal article publications. Haidt and Graham 
(2007) observed over a three-year period that a far higher percentage of articles in the journal 
of social justice research (SJR) addressed fairness/reciprocity and harm/care (78%; 65%) than 
the binding foundations (<50% ingroup/loyalty; 33% authority/respect; 1 single article for 
purity/sanctity). The authors also note that the individualising foundations were far more 
actively endorsed. This is one explicit example, but the trend is pervasive throughout the 
psychological literature (Haidt, 2012). Perhaps the strongest piece of empirical evidence for 
the MFH comes from a set of studies from Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) which will be 
detailed in the next section. 
 
Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) 
 
Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) conducted four separate studies to assess the MFH. 
Studies 1-3 included large samples with diverse demographics. Multiple methods were also 
included: rating the moral relevance of situations; giving moral judgements; committing 
moral trade-offs in the form of hypothetically completing acts for amounts of money; and 
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finally, real-world linguistic analysis of liberal and conservative church sermons (Graham et 
al., 2009). All four studies indicated the same pattern, liberals valued the individualising 
foundations of harm and fairness more than the binding foundations, and conservatives 
valued all five, while emphasising the binding foundations of ingroup, authority and purity 
more than liberals. Across all studies, latent variable models revealed that political identity 
was the best predictor of moral measure scores, beyond other demographic variables. Study 
four, which analysed speeches in different types of churches, is particularly crucial, as it is a 
real-world example, improving the external validity of the MFH. In study 2 specifically, 
2,212 participants (62% female) were first asked to identify their political position on a 7-
point scale anchored by strongly liberal and strongly conservative, with moderate at the 
midpoint. They were then given two measures to complete, the first assessing moral 
relevance responses, and the second moral judgement responses. These two measures were 
later shortened and now make up the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), discussed in 
Chapter 4. Latent variable modelling demonstrated that political identity predicted both 
relevance scores, (parameters estimated = 114), 𝓧²(320) = 3,712.26, Ɛₐ = .07 (Harm (β = -
.27), Fairness (β = -.36), Ingroup (β = .11), Authority (β = .39), and Purity (β = .38), all ps < 
.001), and judgement scores, (parameters estimated = 105), 𝓧²(245) = 2414.62, Ɛₐ = .06 
(Harm (β = -.32), Fairness (β = -.43), Ingroup (β = .67), Authority (β = .62), and Purity (β = 
.57), all ps <.001), in the predicted direction. Negative indicates higher for liberals, positive 
higher for conservatives.  
 
Further Empirical Support for the MFH 
 
There is a strong ingroup affiliation to political orientation. Graham, Nosek, and Haidt 
(2012) sought to assess whether liberals and conservatives would stereotype each other’s 
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moral concerns on the MFQ. Participants completed the questionnaire as themselves, a 
“typical” liberal, and a “typical” conservative. They were mostly accurate in their assessment 
of the divide between liberals and conservatives, scoring liberals higher on the 
individualising foundations, and conservatives higher on the binding foundations. Although, 
respondents underestimated how morally relevant harm was to conservatives. Partisan 
misperception was present in the form of liberals and conservatives both overestimating the 
differences in general. Both groups also overestimated scores of their own group, scoring 
them higher than the actual averages on the corresponding partisan foundations. Interestingly, 
liberals were the least accurate. In particular, in underestimating conservatives concern for 
harm and fairness, and overestimating liberals concern for the same two foundations. 
Conservatives, alternatively, were the most accurate at predicting the two individualising 
foundations. These results are indicative of a partisan motivation to the see the other side as 
opposing your values rather than being motivated by their own valid set of beliefs (Graham, 
Nosek, & Haidt, 2012). The MFH and MFT have been utilised by researchers who do not 
completely subscribe to the theoretical structure behind them but have still provided evidence 
to support the model. 
Rempala, Okdie, and Garvey (2016) assessed the levels of moral motivations 
participants used to justify their political affiliations. In study 1, they observed, by coding 
open ended responses, significant thematic differences in justifications between liberals and 
conservatives that conformed to the MFH. In study 2, using the MFQ, further differences in 
moral foundation influence were observed, wider even than the participants stereotyped 
responses answering as a typical liberal or conservative would. These studies demonstrated 
that individuals were aware of their moral motivations, but to a lesser degree than was 
actually influencing them. Contrary to MFT, however, the authors put the differences 
between liberals and conservatives down to threat sensitivity and resistance to change, with 
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conservatives tending to be higher on both components. This is a common thread among 
researchers who claim conservatism is merely a response to hyperactivation of certain 
cognitive systems. Interestingly in this study, the two groups scored equally on the 
liberty/oppression foundation. Participants also seldom mentioned sanctity/degradation in 
their open-ended responses, despite it having a strong influence on their MFQ results 
(Rempala, Okdie, & Garvey, 2016). The different conceptual explanation from this research 
indicates a further need to assess the moral differences between liberals and conservatives, 
which the current study seeks to do. 
 
Problems with the MFH 
 
Davis et al. (2016) note that most evidence for the MFH uses predominantly white 
participants. They sought to assess whether the effect would hold up in a majority black 
sample, who are generally more religious and liberal than white people in the U.S. In two 
studies, they demonstrated that the MFH does not replicate well in this population. In the 
authority and purity foundations, which met assumptions of weak invariance, there was a 
much stronger relationship with conservatism for white people, than for black people. These 
results indicate that there may be a need for future consideration of ethnicity as a variable to 
reveal a more nuanced picture of the relationship between politics and morality. The authors 
also noted violations of scalar invariance across subscales of the MFQ, presenting problems 
for its between-groups, cross-cultural use. Davies, Sibley, and Liu (2014) ran confirmatory 
factor and correlational analyses testing the MFH in a large New Zealand sample (N = 3,994). 
They found strong positive relationships between the purity/sanctity, authority/ingroup 
foundations and conservatism, moderate positive relationship between ingroup/loyalty and 
conservatism, however, only weak negative relationships between harm/care, 
40 
 
fairness/reciprocity and conservatism. This evidence challenges findings from Graham et al. 
(2009; 2011) and could mean there is less of a relationship between the harm/care, 
fairness/reciprocity foundations, and political ideology. If the results had conformed to the 
MFH, then political conservatism should have also had at least a moderate relationship with 
the individualising foundations, as well as the binding foundations. It is also important to 









Chapter 4: The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) 
 
The moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ) is the tool used in the current research to 
assess participants’ scores on the five moral foundations of MFT. It is a 30-item self-report 
measure made up of two 15-item parts: moral relevance items and moral judgement items 
(Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva & Ditto, 2011). Graham et al. (2011) created the MFQ 
in an attempt to consolidate and move on from existing measures of morality e.g. the Moral 
Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) or the Defining Issues Test-2 (Rest, Navarez, Thoma, 
& Bebeau, 1999), among others, and be inclusive of a more diverse conception of morality. 
The moral relevance and moral judgement measures used in study one and two of Graham et 
al. (2009) were the first versions of the MFQ, later combining to become the complete 
measure. Using both moral relevance and moral judgement items is critical to not only access 
explicit values held by individuals, but also potentially access further foundational concerns 
that they are not as acutely aware of (Graham et al., 2009). These first two were tested on 
large sample sizes, with diverse populations (total N=3,825), through projectimplicit.org. 
After running confirmatory factor analyses using the extensive theoretical background of 
MFT, a third version of the MFQ was created, correcting for weak factor loading and 
redundant correlations between items (Graham et al., 2011). This version was then tested on 
even larger samples through yourmorals.org (total N>28,000). Finally, to establish the final 
fourth 30-item version of the MFQ, an item selection analysis was performed to assess any 
loss or gains in correlations of internal and external validity criteria scales when subscales 
used one, two, three, or four items each. Three items each was ultimately determined the 
most accurate. The final version was again validated using yourmorals.org (N=34,476, 37% 
female, mean age= 36.2 years). Each item is answered on a six-point Likert-style response 
scale (0=not at all relevant, through to 5=extremely relevant for the moral relevance section; 
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0=strongly disagree, through to 5=strongly agree for the moral judgement section). Examples 
of items include: Whether or not someone was cruel for a harm relevance item; Chastity is an 




The subscale alphas are not ideal (ranging from α=.40-.84), however Graham et al. 
(2011) claim this is a reasonable range considering how wide the conceptual understanding of 
moral concerns is across a small number of items. By this, the authors mean that the five 
foundations cover a wide array of human moral concerns so it isn’t surprising that the 
subscales’ Cronbach’s alphas aren’t in the very high range, as more tightly defined variables 
would be. The MFQ is designed to segment the sample into subgroups with different patterns 
of responses, potentially contributing to these lower appearing alphas. Test-retest reliability 
has also been established using a much smaller sample than previous studies of 123 college 
students (mean age= 20.1 years, 69% female). Participants took the MFQ twice, with an 
average of over one month between administrations (Graham et al., 2011). Pearson 
correlations for each foundation were: Harm, r=.71; Fairness, r=.68; Ingroup, r=.69; 
Authority, r=.71; and Purity, r=.82 (all ps <.001). While these aren’t particularly strong 
reliabilities, they are similar to the internal consistency rates.  
 
Factorial Validity 
Structural equation modelling was also used to compare different levels of factor 
structure. This confirmatory factor analysis revealed the best fit for the five-factor model, 
representing the five foundations of MFT and proving better than two-factor (individualising 
vs binding) and three-factor (Shweder’s ethics of autonomy, community and divinity) models 
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(Graham et al., 2011). sample also add to the factorial validity of the measure (see chapter 2 
for details).  
 
Convergent, Criterion and Discriminant Validity 
 
Each foundation was validated using existing scales as relational criteria with each 
foundation compared to three distinct scales (Graham et al., 2009). The authors demonstrated 
convergent and discriminant validity with correlations between external criterion scales and 
foundation scores: for each conceptually-related scale group, the corresponding foundation 
was the strongest predictor of scores (average r=.51) over the other four. They continued with 
support for predictive validity: scores on foundations were shown to be the best predictor of 
attitudes towards conceptually related social groups, above and beyond political attitudes. 
Finally, the theorists note that the MFQ also demonstrates incremental predictive validity in 
comparison to the Schwartz Value Scale (SVS) in predicting attitudes towards social groups 
and political issues. This is important as the SVS is a larger (58-item) measure covering more 




The large heterogeneous samples used in the creation and validation of the MFQ are a 
great step towards generalisability, far better than merely testing on university students as in 
the case of many psychology studies. University students represent a small, unique 
population, which have been demonstrated to be a poor representation of the wider 
population (Henrich, Heine, Norenzayan, 2010). These are still however predominantly white 
samples (87%). Fortunately, Graham et al. (2011) have broken their samples down by world 
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region-of-origin and performed model fit analyses which demonstrated reasonably good fit 
across 11 separate areas, including the U.S, U.K, South East Asia, East Asia, and Australia. 
(all CFI >.7, ε <.06). The previously mentioned study from Davies et al. (2014) also lends 
credence to the generalisability of the MFQ. New Zealand is a culturally and politically 
diverse nation; so, the replication of the five-factors in this sample is very positive evidence 
for its cross-cultural applicability. An insightful study comes from Yilmaz, Harm, 
Bahcekapili and Cesur (2016) in which MFT was tested, using the MFQ, in Turkey, a 
Muslim majority country. In line with the literature, the five-factor structure was shown to 
have the best fit through a confirmatory factor analysis. This is particularly useful for 
supporting the MFQ’s cross-cultural use as Turkey varies considerably in religious and 
political beliefs, not fitting parsimoniously as an individualist or collectivist society (Yilmaz 
et al., 2016). Again, the difference in model fit between the five-factor and hierarchical 
(individualising and binding) models was very slim, indicating both have research utility.  
 
Additional use of the MFQ 
 
We have already covered political and cross-cultural differences revealed using the 
MFQ, but another is gender. This is relevant to address, as gender is one of the predicting 
demographic variables used in the current study as a comparison to political beliefs. Women 
have tended to score higher than men on Harm, Fairness, and Purity in the sample from 
yourmorals.org (n=49,428 women, 68,812 men). This holds after controlling for political 
affiliation and is wider than the gap between individualist and collectivist (Graham et al., 
2011). These results conform to studies in the literature on gender differences in disgust 
sensitivity (Druschel & Sherman, 1999), egalitarianism (Arts & Gelissen, 2001), and 
empathy (Davis, 1983), however, more research is clearly needed in this area to explain the 
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variation. A second study was run by Yilmaz et al. (2016) which demonstrated that priming 
participants to view situations through an individualist or collectivist context resulted in a 
shift in concerns. The individualist manipulation led to more harm concern, while the 
collectivist led to more ingroup concern. This indicates potential for manipulation of moral 








Chapter 5: myPersonality.org and the use of Social Media in Research 
 
Data collected through large-scale social media studies include a far more diverse 
population than a single lab study using individuals from one area. The data has also been 
shown to be as reliable as traditional pen and paper in-person tests (Stillwell & Kosinski, 
2012). Anonymity is also easier to achieve because the participants have no need contact the 
researchers and identifying information might not be collected or can be removed 
automatically before the dataset is stored. The myPersonality project was released in June 
2007, and it provided volunteer Facebook users with a variety of personality and ability 
surveys that they could take and immediately review results. Users were not paid to complete 
measures and this potentially reduced the number of unreliable results as there is more 
intrinsic motivation to complete measures correctly to receive accurate feedback. The data 
from said measures had been freely available to researchers until early 2018. In terms of 
demographics, as of Stillwell and Kosinski (2012), 63% of respondents were female, as 
opposed to 71% on average in studies in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
(JPSP). This more even gender split is also advantageous as it presents a fairer representation 
of the population. Despite this, average age was 23.5 years (47% between 18-24), compared 
to 23 years in the JPSP, so effectively the same. An additional benefit of this method of data 
collection is the ability to reach detached populations due to low cost and the widespread 
availability of Facebook (42% of respondents from outside the U.S) (Stillwell & Kosinski, 
2012). There are of course concerns with the social media methodology. 
Rife, Cate, Kosinski, and Stillwell (2016) questioned whether Facebook data 
represents a biased sample of personalities, not reflective of wider society and therefore 
lacking generalisability. In order to test this, they took a sample of myPersonality respondents 
and compared results on multiple sizes of the international personality item pool (IPIP-NEO) 
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(Goldberg, 1999). At the time of writing, Rife et al. (2016) note that over six million users 
have completed at least one of the measures on the Facebook myPersonality application. 
First, in study one, with results from respondents to a stand-alone website, and then, in study 
two, to two samples of U.S undergraduate students. Tests of reliability exhibited high scores 
across the personality measures (𝛂>.90). Immediately however, there are issues with this 
methodology, in that undergraduate students are themselves a questionable population when 
considering external validity. They have been demonstrated to represent a unique portion of 
society, rather than a wider snapshot (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). It is possible 
then that these two comparisons are just comparing internet users with internet users and 
undergraduate students. Results indicated that while statistically significant differences did 
exist between the Facebook data and comparative data sets, the effect sizes were so small so 
as to not equate to practical significance (Rife et al., 2016). The only notable difference 
between the groups in study one was for openness to experience (η²=.04). In study two, again 
openness was the only characteristic greater than a trivial effect size (η²=.11). It is clear that 
these statistically significant but very small effects were found due to the large sample sizes 
and therefore very high statistical power. The notable impact of openness was put down, by 
the researchers, to the novel experience of being on Facebook appealing to those higher in the 
trait. Rife et al. (2016) concluded that Facebook represented a promising setting for data 
gathering, at least as effective as undergraduate samples, with potentially far greater 
diversity. They did not discover any systematic bias with significant practical value. The use 
of Facebook data by researchers in the social sciences in general is rising, there had been 475 
published studies using this method of data gathering as of April 2012 (Wilson, Gosling, & 
Graham, 2012). 
Notable research using Facebook data have studied topics including attitude similarity 
and strategic interactions among social networks, political mobilisation, differences and 
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variations in mood between nations (Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010; Kramer, 2010; Kohli, 
Bachrach, Stillwell, Kearns, Herbrich, & Grapel, 2012; Bond, Fariss, Jones, Kramer, Marlow, 
Settle, & Fowler, 2012). This trend is likely to continue as more people use Facebook and 
interact in more behaviourally complex ways online. According to Carpenter (2012), trait 
narcissism is related to how people present themselves on Facebook. This may act as a 
moderator in studies which have found accurate reflections of real-world personality on 
Facebook. Other research has demonstrated that Facebook profiles do reflect accurate 
representations of individual personality, rather than idealised caricatures (Back, Stopfer, 
Vazire, Gaddis, Schmukle, Egloff, & Gosling, 2010). This would need to be replicated as 
social media has increased exponentially in recent years so there is a possibility that people 
have also changed how they portray themselves online.  
The myPersonality data should include respondents from both individualist and 
collectivist cultures so it will ideally be balanced across the moral foundations. Participants 
will also vary across what are termed tight and loose countries, those that conform tightly to 
social norms, and those that are more lenient, respectively (Gelfand, Mishi, & Raver, 2006). 
In a different vein to the MFT research, but still utilising Facebook, Feldman, Charo, Farh, 
and Bardi (2015) used a sample of the myPersonality Facebook data (N = 1024) to assess the 
relationship between personal values and their level of unethicality, both accessed through 
the linguistic patterns of participant statuses. Feldman et al. (2015) emphasise the point that 
this Facebook data is a representation of a naturalistic setting. One must question however 
just how naturalistic an online environment can be considered. While it is certainly an 
integral part of modern society, it is still a theoretical debate as to just how natural these 
interactions can be considered. This is perhaps out of the reach of the current research, 




A Note on Cambridge Analytica 
 
The recent scandal surrounding the data collection company Cambridge Analytica and 
its unethical use of mined personal data has thrust social media research into public 
awareness (Isaak & Hanna, 2018). The most potent concerns voiced around the world are that 
of privacy and protecting one's data. Fortunately, the data the current study uses from 
myPersonality.org is not metadata taken without expressed permission, it is data that was 
collected from volunteer participants who had provided informed consent to allow their data 
to be used for research. The current study only uses responses from the MFQ and 










Recent years have seen growing concern about the reproducibility of findings in 
psychology. High profile cases of fraud, p-hacking, and inability to replicate previous effects 
have severely dented the reputation of psychological science, particularly within the social 
psychology field. Perhaps the ignition for the concerns of replication is most effectively 
observed in an Open Science Collaboration (2015), led by Brian Nosek and colleagues, 
which attempted to reproduce the effects of 100 separate studies from three psychological 
journals. Replications were performed as close as possible to the conditions of the original 
study, including both experimental and correlational designs. To evaluate the reproducibility, 
significance and p values, effect sizes, subjective assessments of replication teams, and meta-
analyses of effect sizes were reported (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). The authors noted 
that the mean effect size of replications (M᷊ = 0.197, SD = 0.257) was less than half that of the 
original studies (M᷊ = 0.403, SD = 0.188). Considerably worse was the statistical significance, 
with only 36% of the replications achieving a p-value below the alpha level threshold of .05, 
compared to 97% of the original studies. Crucially, correlational assessments revealed that 
success of the replication was predicted more effectively by the original results, over 
properties of the replication and original teams (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). This 
means that the levels of expertise or experience within teams, which can be a factor in 
replication success, were not the determining factors in these studies.  
The lack of replication in the literature has long been a concern and can be attributed 
to some degree to publication bias. There is more incentive for researchers to publish new 
and exciting effects, rather than replicate previous findings. These incentives include 
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enhanced ability to receive grants, greater change of employment and promotion, and to get 
research published because editors are more likely to accept these manuscripts (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015). It is the field itself and the public however that lose in this scenario. 
Too often study results are treated as fact, for instance in popular psychology books, or in 
journalistic articles which present the effect of one study as a universal property of humans 
(cf. Rad, Matingano, &Ginges, 2018). Conversely, it is rare for those in the media to return to 
a story to mention if these effects are later shown to be unsubstantiated as it does not make 
for interesting reading outside academia. Science progresses through consistent empirical 
evidence. No effect in psychology should be considered outright fact, only that it has 
supporting or disconfirming evidence. Fortunately, this crisis has presented the field with an 
opportunity to move forward, practising sound, efficient, and reproducible scientific 
methodology. The current research, which performs a replication, employed various 
techniques to maintain transparency and avoid misusing data. These include pre-registration 
of methods and hypotheses and not looking at data until after pre-registration. With pre-
registration, we can concretely present our hypotheses, which prevents later p-hacking, re-
analysing data until a significant effect or model is found (fit-hacking), which the hypothesis 
can be adjusted to match. The MFH has considerable supporting evidence, but there are also 
studies which demonstrate weakness. The current study might lend support to either side, 
improving our certainty of the validity of the MFH or creating a new pathway of conflicting 
research that needs to be followed.  
 
Structural Equation Modelling 
 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) is not a single statistical technique, it 
encompasses a group of procedures and has multiple applications (e.g. confirmatory factor 
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analysis or the latent variable model used in the current study) (Kline, 2015). Perhaps the 
most significant departure of SEM from simpler statistical methods is its reliance on the 
researcher having a theoretical base for the model. A latent variable model, such as the one 
used in the current study, is meaningless if the items indicating the latent variables are only 
correlated by chance (Morgan, Bollen and & Pearl, 2013). Kline (2015) notes that SEM 
distinguishes between observed and latent variables. Being able to analyse observed and 
latent variables, and to model and account for the effects of measurement error, distinguishes 
SEM from multiple regression and analysis of variance (ANOVA) (standard statistical 
techniques). There are two main goals of SEM analyses: understand the covariance among 
observed variables and explain as much of the variance as possible using the researcher’s 
model (Kline, 2015). However, while it is the basic datum of SEM, covariance is not the only 
function, means can also be analysed. Critically, as is the case with the current research, SEM 
models require very large data samples (generally should have at least a 20:1 ratio of cases: 
parameters requiring estimates) (Kline, 2015). This gives the analysis enough statistical 
power. Unfortunately, most published samples using SEM have inadequate sample sizes 
(Westland, 2010). Perhaps most important to remember when interpreting SEM analysis 
results is that the most that can be concluded is that the model is consistent with the data. We 
cannot conclusively infer causation or claim that the model is generally proven. This is 
another problem in the reporting of SEM statistics, as strong causal claims are too often made 




This study is a direct replication of study 2 from Graham et al.’s (2009) study Liberals 
and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations, using a very similar latent 
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variable model to the one used by those authors, applied to a large existing dataset of 
participant responses to the MFQ. The parameters of the model will assess whether political 
identity i.e. how liberal or conservative each participant is, predicts their scores on each of the 
five moral foundations of MFT i.e. provides supporting or disconfirming evidence to the 
MFH. Moral foundations scores will be made from the 30-item MFQ, six items per 
foundation. In addition to political identity, age and sex will also be used as predicting 
variables. Our prediction is that political identity will predict foundation scores better than 
other demographic variables, such that higher levels of liberal political identity will predict 
higher scores on the individualising foundations (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity), while 
higher levels of conservative political identity will predict more stable scores across all five 
foundations, and higher scores than liberals on the binding foundations (ingroup/loyalty, 
authority/respect, purity/sanctity). Whether this prediction is supported will be based on the 
results of a full structural equation model. The hypothesis will be supported if the model has 
good fit i.e. all fit index scores will reach the threshold of acceptable levels of fit (RMSEA 
<.07; CFI ≥0.95; TLI ≥.95). Additionally, for the prediction to be supported, regression 
estimates must be in the predicted direction, with positive relationships between liberalness 
and the foundations of Harm and Fairness and negative relationships between liberalness and 











The current research was pre-registered with the Open Science Framework at osf.io 
(Review the following link https://osf.io/4g5y7/). It was entered through the Social 
Psychology template (van’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016). Included in the pre-registration was 
a detailed account of the study’s theoretical context, predictions, data collection process, and 
data analysis plan. As the plan is made public, this process maintains the transparency of the 
research and leaves the researchers accountable to their original plans. Review appendix a for 
a document version of the pre-registration.   
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
Participants were drawn from an existing dataset, collected through the myPersonality 
Facebook application (review Chapter 5 of the literature review for information on the app) 
(Kosinski, Matz, Gosling, Popov, & Stillwell, 2015). This application recruited over 7 million 
Facebook users, with each individual having participated in at least one of the psychometric 
tests offered from 2007-2012 (Rohrer, Egloff, Kosinski, Stillwell, and Schmukle, 2018). A 
total of 1261 participants (55% female) who identified the U.S as their home country, with a 
mean age of 25.8 years (SD = 8.4; Range = 15-78) and who completed the MFQ were 
included in the current analyses. 757 participants identified as politically liberal, 147 as 
conservative, and 357 as moderate. The sample size is a very small proportion of total users 
of myPersonality.org due to the very specific parameters of the study (from the U.S, 
answered the MFQ, additional data exclusion criteria etc.). The sample was restricted to the 
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U.S to match the sample used by Graham et al. (2009). Additionally, the empirical evidence 
to support the moral foundations hypothesis mainly comes from this population so it is 
important to establish whether the trend continues using a sample from a different source 
(Facebook) (Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2018). This sample, after applying the exclusion 
criteria detailed below, came from a total dataset of N = 14,905. Participants were originally 
recruited through the myPersonality application on Facebook and were not paid for their 
time. Participation was based on voluntary interest as each participant was given a summary 
of their results and a brief interpretation of their questionnaire scores following their 
completion of each measure. The data was then de-identified and shared in an anonymous 




Several criteria were used to exclude unusable data. Review the following link for the 
studies complete coding procedure https://osf.io/ab3tj/. Code was created for the following 
exclusions: participant’s home country outside the U.S.A; participants with outlying 
demographic variables (age <=15 & >=99); participants who failed the MFQ catch items; 
participants who missed 14 or more of the MFQ items.  This last cut off was used to only 
include participants with enough responses to form a valid entry in the dataset. Missing half 
or more of the items on the measure would indicate that the participant has not taken the 
questionnaire seriously enough and could bias results (Kung, Kwok, and Brown, 2017). 
Fortunately, no participants missed this many items so this rule was redundant. Additionally, 
the MFQ has two built in catch items. In part 1: MATH - “Whether or not someone was good 
at math.” This item is not scored; it is included both to force people to use the bottom end of 
the scale, and to catch and exclude participants who respond with the last 3 response options 
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(somewhat relevant, very relevant, extremely relevant) (Haidt, 2009). Participants were 
excluded in line with this. In part 2: GOOD - “It is better to do good than to do bad.” This is 
also not scored and included to force use of the top of the scale, and to catch and cut people 
who respond with the first 3 response options (strongly disagree, moderately disagree, 
slightly disagree) (Haidt, 2009). Participants were excluded in line with this. Answering the 
Math or Good items in these ranges was deemed by the authors as demonstrating an irrational 
response and indicative of a lack of attention or skipping through the measure without fully 
reading the items. The function of catch items in psychometric measures is to test 
attentiveness and identify participants who are not answering in good faith i.e. just selecting 
any response to get to the end (Graham et al., 2009). There is a potential concern that 
attention checks such as these can influence results by directing respondents to think in a 
certain manner and therefore change the way they respond to future items in the measure, 
distorting the validity of the scale. Kung, Kwok and Brown (2017) tested this hypothesis 
across two studies, using two common attention check techniques: structured-response items 
and an instructional manipulation check. They found no empirical support that scale validity 




Before completing the moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ), participants were 
asked about their political identity. They were asked to indicate where they identify 
politically on a 7-point Likert-style scale, anchored by strongly conservative (1) and strongly 
liberal (7), with moderate in the centre (4). Participants were then required to complete two 
parts to the 30-item validated MFQ (Review Chapter 4 of the literature review for analysis of 
the MFQ measure; see appendix b for a full version of the scale). In part 1, moral relevance 
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items, they were asked “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what 
extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?” They were then required 
to rate 15 moral relevance items and one catch item on a six-point Likert-style scale 
(anchored by 0=not at all relevant, and 5=extremely relevant). An item example from part 1 
is: “Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty”, corresponding to the authority 
foundation of moral foundations theory (MFT). In part 2, moral judgement items, they were 
told to “Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement.” 
Again, they were required to rate all 15 moral judgement items and one catch item on a six-
point scale (anchored by 0=strongly disagree, and 5=strongly agree). An item example from 
part 2 is: “Justice is the most important requirement for a society”, corresponding to the 
fairness foundation of MFT. Reliability estimates were calculated from the new dataset and 
the following are the Cronbach’s alpha for each of the moral foundations of the MFQ: Harm 




After being deemed low risk, the study was peer reviewed by both supervising 
researchers (Dr. Matt Williams and Dr. Peter Cannon) and another lecturer from the school of 
psychology at Massey University, not affiliated with the study. A low risk notification 
(44000020141) was then lodged with Massey University Human Ethics Committee. 
 
Data Processing and Analysis 
 
This study used an existing data set, so limited equipment was required. All analyses 
were run through R studio, in the R programming language (RStudio Team, 2015; Merkle & 
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Rosseel, 2018; Rosseel, 2012). The data-set was stored on an external HDD before being 
used. The data was held by supervising researcher Dr. Peter Cannon and not looked at by the 
lead researcher until after the study had been pre-registered. Initially, the dataset was cleaned 
and prepared for analysis by Dr. Cannon. This included removing any I.D’s with multiple 
participations and removing I.D’s with single value responses for all items. These exclusions 
were completed using specific code in R-studio. Once pre-registration was formally 
confirmed, the data was transferred from Dr. Peter Cannon to Alexander Bidwell for the 
analysis to begin. It was important not to look at the data before pre-registration in order to 
maintain transparency for the analysis and to prevent changing analysis strategies to suit the 
data rather than the study predictions. All models and other statistical methods were created 
and run through R-studio, specifically using the lavaan package (version 0.6-3) for CFA and 
SEM (Rosseel, 2012).  
There were multiple options for the dataset to be used in this study. Dr. Peter Cannon, 
supervising researcher, had access to the original dataset in its raw form, and a form with all 
missing data removed. It was eventually decided to use the raw dataset, so all missing data 
could be dealt with manually. This meant that the analyses were more transparent, and the 
researchers knew exactly what was happening with the original missing data. At each step of 
data processing, a new subset of data was created after applying exclusion coding rules. 1213 
missing data points remained after applying these rules. Missing data needs to be carefully 
dealt with in large-scale analysis. There are various types of missing data, but for this dataset, 
it is considered Missing at Random (MAR). MAR data can be replaced with actual values 
using imputation (Little & Rubin, 1987). This is because it is assumed that the data points can 
be predicted based on the other data. An example from the current study would be using 
participant responses on five of the six Harm items, to predict the value that was missed on 
the sixth. This is not a perfect prediction however, it is merely a stronger probabilistic 
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relationship than it would be if the missing data remained missing (Little & Rubin, 1987). 
Missing data was imputed using expectation maximisation, a form of single imputation. This 
form of imputation was most appropriate to use because it maintains inter-variable 
relationships through first using the other variables available to impute the missing values 
(expectation), and then performs checks on whether the imputed value is the most likely 
(maximisation) (Zhang, 2016). Imputation has multiple methods but is separated into the 
categories of single and multiple. The basic goal is to find the most likely value for each 
datapoint, rather than using missing data, to improve the accuracy of the analysis (Zhang, 
2016). As there is not a large amount of missing data in this dataset, single imputation is the 
simplest and most efficient way to predict the missing values. Alternatively, for more serious 
cases of missing data, multiple imputation is required to simulate multiple models which use 
possible responses and compute a variance/confidence interval to attempt to understand the 
differences between multiple imputed datasets (Zhang, 2016). The process is much more 




The structural equation model (SEM) was formed from multiple parts, beginning with 
the measurement and definition of latent variables, wherein each response item on the MFQ 
was assigned as an indicating variable of the corresponding moral foundation latent variable 
(e.g. “Whether or not someone suffered emotionally,” represented by the item code Harm1 
was a manifest/measured item for the Harm latent variable). This is called the measurement 
model and also serves the function of a confirmatory factor analysis on the factor structure of 
MFT in the dataset. View the following Figure 1 path diagram for the confirmatory factor 
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Figure 1. Path Diagram of CFA.  
Note: ovals contain each factor/foundation; rectangles contain each MFQ item; circles to the 
right of the items indicate standard error; two-sided arrows indicate correlations; one sided 
arrows indicate predicting regression. 
 
Here, each factor was measured by the six corresponding items on the moral 
foundations questionnaire (Graham et al., 2009). This CFA was then used as the 
measurement model section of the eventual SEM. Next, the regression section assigns each of 
the foundation latent variables as regressed on, i.e. predicted by, each of the demographic 
variables (age, gender) and the main independent variable of political identity. Age and 
gender were used as control variables to isolate political identity as the prominent predictive 
variable. While the original model from Graham et al. (2009) used age, gender, household 
income, and education as demographic variables, the current dataset did not have sufficient 
data for these. On that note, state, which was included as a variable in the pre-registration, 
could also not be used due to a lack of data (only home and current country were identified, 
not specific states). Finally, there was no reason to exclude the presence of covariances 
between the independent variables. See the following figure 2 for the path-diagram 



















































Univariate Descriptive Statistics 
 
Figure 3 displays histogram plots of scoring across each of the five foundation 
variables. Visual inspection reveals a difference in mean score between foundations. 
Harm/Care and Fairness/Cheating are both negative skewed, with most participants scoring at 
the upper end of the scale, as opposed to Authority/Subversion, Loyalty/Betrayal, and 
Sanctity/Degradation which are approximately symmetrically distributed and show higher 
density in the middle range of the scale. This distribution of scores would be predicted by 
Graham et al. (2009) and MFT as, regardless of political identification, all participants should 















Figure 3.  Histogram plots of participants scores on each of the five foundations of Moral 
Foundations Theory: Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority, and Purity. 
 




The linear relationship between all demographic variables and the moral foundations 
was checked using zero order correlations in order to assess any relationships between 
variables in the wider model. These were run as exploratory analyses, not as pre-registered 
confirmatory analyses. First, composite scores on each foundation were created for each 
participant (e.g. an individual's mean score for Harm items 1 through 6). Once these were 
created, the correlation between each demographic variable with each foundation composite 
score was calculated. See Table 1 for correlation results. 
 
Table 1 
Correlations Between Demographic Variables and Moral Foundations 
 
Foundation 
Demographic Variable Harm Fairness Ingroup Authority Purity 
Age .06 .01 .03 .04 .05 
Gender .17 .08 -.01 .04 .08 
Liberalness .08 .12 -.19 -.26 -.31 
Note: All p values <0.01 
 
The exploratory correlational analysis revealed tentative support for the predictions of 
the study, in that liberalness predicted scores on the five foundations of MFT in the expected 
direction. The strongest support came from the binding foundations, with a weak-moderate 
negative relationship between liberalness and Ingroup (r = -.19), and moderate negative 
relationships between liberalness and Authority (r = -.26) and Purity (r = -.31). These indicate 
that participants whom scored in the conservative range on the liberalness scale, were more 
likely to also score higher on the binding foundations of Ingroup, Authority, and Purity. The 
relationships between liberalness and the individualising foundations were not as strong with 
both weak positive relationships between liberalness and Harm (r= .08) and Fairness (r= .12). 
These indicate that participants whom scored in the liberal range of the political identity 
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scale, were more likely to score higher on the individualising foundations of Harm and 
Fairness. It is important to stress that these predictions are tentative. Interestingly, there was a 
weak-moderate positive relationship between gender and the Harm (r= .17) foundation, and 
weak positive relationships between gender and Fairness (r= .08) and Purity (r= .08), 
indicating that when a participant was female, they tended to endorse these foundations as 
having more relevance to morality.  It is important to note that these correlations are all 
statistically significant (α = .01) because correlation tests are highly sensitive with large 
sample sizes, such as the one used in the current study.  
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
 
Confirmatory factor analyses were the first planned pre-registered analyses. The 
estimation method used in both the CFA and SEM was maximum likelihood (ML). ML uses 
probability distributions to estimate parameters of the model (e.g. predictions, covariances, 
correlations) that maximise the likelihood of the data observed, given the assumed model 
(Eliason, 1993). There were three model fit statistics specified in the pre-registration 
document: Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), Comparative fit index (CFI), 
and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), sometimes called the Non-Normed-fit index (NNFI). As 
mentioned in the Pre-registration, the acceptable fit threshold for each fit index are: RMSEA 
< 0.070, CFI and TLI ≥ 0.95. The RMSEA is an absolute fit index which determines how 
well the model, based on the theoretical framework of the study (i.e. a priori, rather than a 
baseline model), fits the data sample by informing us about the degree of model misfit 
relative to the degrees of freedom (Hopper, Coughlin, & Mullen, 2008). Specifically, the 
RMSEA is a good choice of fit statistic due to its ability to select the model with fewer 
parameters (i.e. choosing the most parsimonious option) (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000). 
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This is different to the CFI and TLI which are incremental fit indices. The function of these 
indices is to compare a baseline model to the calculated chi-square value, hence the other 
names for the indices: comparative or relative (Hopper et al., 2008). The baseline model in 
this study would be the default which assumes no true relationships between any of the 
observed variables. How well the hypothesised model explains the covariance matrix above 
and beyond the baseline model is proportionally described by these indices (Lai & Green, 
2016). Acceptable in this context means a value above/below or equal to the cut-offs, 
depending on whether scoring above or below the threshold is desirable. The acceptable 
thresholds mentioned here come from progression in the consensus of the field. The CFI, for 
example, had an initial acceptable threshold of ≥ 0.9 until a study from Hu and Bentler (1991) 
indicated that this was too low to prevent acceptance of mis-specified models, advising that ≥ 
0.95 was more appropriate. The current CFA model converged successfully but did not have 
acceptable fit based on all three fit indices: RMSEA (.0701) CFI (0.77) and TLI (0.75). As 
the model did not reach acceptable levels of fit on any of the fit indices, and had very poor fit 
on two out of the three, we can conclude that the model does not fit this dataset. Review the 
below Table 2 for the full output of the CFA parameter estimates. 
 
Table 2 
Pre-registered Confirmatory Factor Analysis Parameter Estimates 
 












Factor Loadings       
Harm1 <- Harm 1.000 0.000 NA NA 1.000 1.000 
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Harm2 <- Harm 1.135 0.050 22.910 <0.001 1.039 1.233 
Harm3 <- Harm 0.872 0.042 20.524 <0.001 0.788 0.955 
Harm4 <- Harm 1.095 0.047 23.062 <0.001 1.004 1.190 
Harm5 <- Harm 0.777 0.050 15.386 <0.001 0.677 0.875 
Harm6 <- Harm 0.872 0.057 15.225 <0.001 0.760 0.984 
Fair1 <- Fairness 1.000 0.000 NA NA 1.000 1.000 
Fair2 <- Fairness 0.869 0.039 22.237 <0.001 0.792 0.945 
Fair3 <- Fairness 0.754 0.042 17.919 <0.001 0.668 0.833 
Fair4 <- Fairness 0.704 0.046 15.346 <0.001 0.612 0.791 
Fair5 <- Fairness 0.366 0.044 8.297 <0.001 0.276 0.449 
Fair6 <- Fairness 0.507 0.051 9.859 <0.001 0.403 0.604 
Aut1 <- Authority 1.000 0.000 NA NA 1.000 1.000 
Aut2 <- Authority 0.549 0.030 18.505 <0.001 0.491 0.607 
Aut3 <- Authority 0.611 0.027 22.502 <0.001 0.558 0.644 
Aut4 <- Authority 0.960 0.024 40.480 <0.001 0.912 1.005 
Aut5 <- Authority 0.682 0.039 17.696 <0.001 0.605 0.756 
Aut6 <- Authority 0.738 0.033 22.312 <0.001 0.672 0.802 
Ing1 <- Ingroup 1.000 0.000 NA NA 1.000 1.000 
Ing2 <- Ingroup 0.767 0.047 16.390 <0.001 0.669 0.852 
Ing3 <- Ingroup 0.822 0.047 17.423 <0.001 0.725 0.910 
Ing4 <- Ingroup 0.816 0.033 14.397 <0.001 0.751 0.882 
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Ing5 <- Ingroup 0.680 0.038 17.878 <0.001 0.603 0.752 
Ing6 <- Ingroup 0.561 0.035 16.060 <0.001 0.491 0.628 
Pur1 <- Purity  1.000 0.000 NA NA 1.000 1.000 
Pur2 <- Purity 0.653 0.030 22.047 <0.001 0.596 0.712 
Pur3 <-Purity 1.239 0.036 34.708 <0.001 1.168 1.307 
Pur4 <- Purity 0.919 0.027 33.511 <0.001 0.865 0.973 
Pur5 <- Purity 0.929 0.030 30.945 <0.001 0.869 0.987 
Pur6 <- Purity 1.077 0.030 35.877 <0.001 1.017 1.135 
Factor Variances 
      
Harm 0.495 0.036 13.649 <0.001 0.422 0.564 
Fairness 0.609 0.042 14.538 <0.001 0.528 0.692 
Ingroup 1.165 0.052 22.602 <0.001 1.066 1.268 
Authority 0.941 0.054 17.420 <0.001 0.838 1.049 
Purity 1.236 0.052 23.802 <0.001 1.135 1.339 
Covariances 
      
Harm <- Fairness 0.411 0.030 13.520 <0.001 0.351 0.470 
Harm <- Authority 0.108 0.024 4.553 <0.001 0.061 0.154 
Harm <- Ingroup 0.153 0.022 7.053 <0.001 0.109 0.194 
Harm <- Purity 0.226 0.022 10.083 <0.001 0.181 0.269 
Fairness <- Authority 0.047 0.027 1.741 0.082 -0.006 0.099 
Fairness <- Ingroup 0.122 0.025 4.977 <0.001 0.073 0.170 
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Fairness <- Purity 0.035 0.026 1.344 0.179 -0.016 0.086 
Authority <- Ingroup 0.840 0.040 20.967 <0.001 0.765 0.922 
Ingroup <- Purity  0.911 0.036 24.444 <0.001 0.842 0.982 
Authority <- Purity  0.711 0.035 40.479 <0.001 0.645 0.782 
 
Looking first at the item-foundation estimates, we can see that the strongest 
relationships between items and their corresponding foundation (latent variable) came from 
the Harm and Purity foundations. Harm had a mean unstandardized factor loading of 0.96, 
while Purity had a mean of 0.83. The higher the estimated value, the stronger the relationship 
between each item and its corresponding foundation. In comparison, the Fairness foundation 
had the weakest relationship with its corresponding items with a mean estimate of 0.70. In 
addition to the parameter estimates, the distance between confidence intervals of each 
foundation item are consistently short, indicating appropriateness of the factor loadings.  
 
Structural Equation Model  
 
After the CFA, a full structural equation model (SEM) was run to test the hypotheses 
of the study. Like the CFA, the SEM converged successfully, but this time the model reached 
acceptable fit based on the RMSEA fit index (0.068). Again however, the model fit did not 
reach the acceptable threshold for either of the other model fit indices (CFI = 0.767, TLI = 
0.738). While the RMSEA indicated acceptable fit, based on the three index results, we 
cannot conclude that the model fits the data. As the SEM contained the same foundation 
latent variable to manifest item structure as the CFA, the per-item parameter estimates, and 
confidence intervals were very similar. Most important to review in the results table are the 
regression estimates which test the distinct predictions made in the study hypotheses. There 
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are positive relationships present between both the individualising foundations of Harm (b = 
.07, 95% CI [.05; .10], p < .001) and Fairness (b = .12, 95% CI [.09; .16], p <.001), and 
liberalness. This indicates that participants whom scored higher on the Harm and Fairness 
foundations also tended to score higher on the liberalness scale (i.e. self-identified as being 
more politically liberal). While these associations are on the weak side, they still support the 
hypothesis. In contrast, there were moderate negative associations between each of the 
binding foundations i.e. Ingroup (b = -.29, 95% CI [-.33; -.25], p <.001), Authority (b = -.37, 
95% CI [-.40; -.34], p < .001), and Purity (b =-.39, 95% CI [-.42; -.36], p < .001), and 
liberalness. These indicate that participants whom scored higher on the binding foundations 
tended to score lower on the liberalness scale (i.e. self-identified as more politically 
conservative). To summarise, the predictions made about the direction of the regression 
estimates were supported, however the predictions about model fit were not, so based on the 
combined inferential criteria set out in the preregistration, the MFH was not supported with 
this analysis.  
 
Table 3 
Pre-registered confirmatory SEM Parameter Estimates 








Harm1 <- Harm 1.000 0.000 NA <0.001 1.000 1.000 
Harm2 <- Harm 1.122 0.061 18.477 <0.001 0.997 1.239 
Harm3 <- Harm 0.866 0.050 17.298 <0.001 0.765 0.960 
Harm4 <- Harm 1.102 0.059 18.533 <0.001 0.984 1.213 
Harm5 <- Harm 0.878 0.066 13.375 <0.001 0.749 1.001 
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Harm6 <- Harm 0.919 0.070 13.060 <0.001 0.780 1.059 
Fair1 <- Fairness 1.000 0.000 NA <0.001 1.000 1.000 
Fair2 <- Fairness 0.844 0.042 20.118 <0.001 0.762 0.922 
Fair3 <- Fairness 0.731 0.047 15.696 <0.001 0.639 0.818 
Fair4 <- Fairness 0.703 0.049 14.216 <0.001 0.607 0.802 
Fair5 <- Fairness 0.346 0.049 7.118 <0.001 0.251 0.442 
Fair6 <- Fairness 0.518 0.060 8.700 <0.001 0.400 0.645 
Ing1 <- Ingroup 1.000 0.000 NA <0.001 1.000 1.000 
Ing2 <- Ingroup 0.727 0.048 15.061 <0.001 0.630 0.817 
Ing3 <- Ingroup 0.792 0.049 16.049 <0.001 0.693 0.883 
Ing4 <- Ingroup 0.828 0.038 21.6000 <0.001 0.753 0.903 
Ing5 <- Ingroup 0.663 0.046 14.408 <0.001 0.572 0.750 
Ing6 <- Ingroup 0.541 0.039 13.931 <0.001 0.465 0.615 
Aut1 <- Authority 1.000 0.000 NA <0.001 1.000 1.000 
Aut2 <- Authority 0.539 0.034 15.792 <0.001 0.472 0.605 
Aut3 <- Authority 0.603 0.030 19.879 <0.001 0.544 0.667 
Aut4 <- Authority 0.968 0.028 34.920 <0.001 0.913 1.022 
Aut5 <- Authority 0.630 0.046 13.549 <0.001 0.537 0.715 
Aut6 <- Authority 0.731 0.037 19.640 <0.001 0.657 0.802 
Pur1 <- Purity  1.000 0.000 NA <0.001 1.000 1.000 
Pur2 <- Purity 0.539 0.034 19.608 <0.001 0.596 0.728 
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Pur3 <- Purity 0.603 0.042 30.041 <0.001 1.180 1.345 
Pur4 <- Purity 1.263 0.035 26.572 <0.001 0.857 0.992 
Pur5 <- Purity 0.926 0.036 26.199 <0.001 0.882 1.022 
Pur6 <- Purity 1.115 0.036 31.285 <0.001 1.045 1.184 
Factor Variances 
      
Harm 0.424 0.036 11.698 <0.001 0.354 0.496 
Fairness 0.563 0.045 13.384 <0.001 0.478 0.651 
Ingroup 0.764 0.047 16.171 <0.001 0.679 0.856 
Authority 0.826 0.054 15.167 <0.001 0.727 0.931 
Purity 0.818 0.048 17.013 <0.001 0.726 0.916 
Age 104.683 8.949 11.698 <0.001 86.673 121.752 
Gender 0.241 0.002 123.700 <0.001 0.237 0.245 
Liberalness 2.362 0.063 37.295 <0.001 2.242 2.491 
Covariances 
      
Age <- Gender 0.309 0.112 2.760 <0.001 0.088 0.516 
Age <- Liberalness -0.443 0.373 -1.188 0.235 -1.187 0.319 
Gender <- Liberalness 0.059 0.017 3.435 0.0001 0.026 0.092 
Harm <- Fairness 0.363 0.031 11.872 <0.001 0.304 0.423 
Harm <- Ingroup 0.203 0.023 8.775 <0.001 0.160 0.249 
Harm <- Authority 0.138 0.023 5.874 <0.001 0.092 0.184 
Harm <- Purity 0.255 0.023 11.076 <0.001 0.211 0.301 
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Fairness <- Ingroup 0.201 0.026 7.848 <0.001 0.152 0.254 
Fairness <- Authority 0.147 0.029 5.038 <0.001 0.091 0.203 
Fairness <- Purity 0.127 0.026 4.950 <0.001 0.078 0.177 
Ingroup <- Authority 0.596 0.036 16.459 <0.001 0.532 0.665 
Ingroup <- Purity  0.265 0.030 15.439 <0.001 0.409 0.526 
Authority <- Purity  0.531 0.035 15.098 <0.001 0.463 0.603 
Regressions 
      
Harm <- Age 0.009 0.002 5.392 <0.001 0.005 0.012 
Fairness <- Age 0.005 0.002 2.758 0.006 0.001 0.009 
Ingroup <- Age 0.009 0.002 3.737 <0.001 0.004 0.014 
Authority <- Age 0.011 0.002 4.834 <0.001 0.007 0.016 
Purity <- Age 0.005 0.002 2.462 0.014 0.001 0.009 
Harm <- Gender 0.358 0.041 8.728 <0.001 0.279 0.437 
Fairness <- Gender 0.256 0.043 6.002 <0.001 0.174 0.338 
Ingroup <- Gender -0.078 0.050 -1.561 0.118 -0.178 0.022 
Authority <- Gender 0.313 0.052 6.004 <0.001 0.211 0.416 
Purity <- Gender 0.270 0.050 5.442 <0.001 0.179 0.363 
Harm <- Liberalness 0.073 0.013 5.494 <0.001 0.046 0.099 
Fairness <- Liberalness 0.125 0.016 8.005 <0.001 0.093 0.157 
Ingroup <- Liberalness -0.294 0.020 -14.348 <0.001 -0.334 -0.254 
Authority <- Liberalness -0.373 0.026 -22.788 <0.001 -0.405 -0.341 
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Purity <- Liberalness  -0.391 0.017 -22.702 <0.001 -0.423 -0.357 
 
Non-Preregistered Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Although the CFA was found to have acceptable model fit using the RMSEA index, 
the estimates for two other fit indices were sub-optimal. To investigate this further and to 
assess for alternative factor structures an exploratory factor analysis was run to assess 
whether the loading of each moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ) item aligns with what is 
predicted by moral foundations theory (MFT). An EFA is a form of analysis which is used to 
identify underlying latent variables within a dataset which can explain relationships between 
observed variables. EFA is commonly used to identify individual traits e.g. personality traits, 
social attitudes etc. (Haig, 2010). It is an abductive inference method, in that latent variables 
are identified which can then be further explored and potentially explained. When multiple 
variables are highly correlated, it could be hypothesised that there is an underlying cause to 
this relationship, which would be identified as a common factor in EFA (Haig, 2010). This 
relationship is then able to be further analysed. In the current study context, the EFA was an 
R-type factor analysis as the factors were calculated from a correlation matrix, as opposed to 
a Q-type factor analysis, which calculates factors from the individual respondent (Haig, 
2010). The analysis was completed using the psych package in r-studio (Revelle, 2018). The 
initial parallel analysis, one of the newer forms of EFA, which is performed prior to 
extraction of factors, recognised eight factors, much higher than the five of MFT, 
contradicting previous research that the MFQ is accessing five factors. Parallel analysis 
allows for greater confidence in the factors identified than earlier forms of EFA (Wood, 
Akloubou Gnonhosou, & Bowling, 2015). It does this by generating random data based on 
the sample size and number of variables in a dataset, extracting factors based on this and 
calculating the average eigenvalues. These eigenvalues are then compared to the ones from 
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the actual data sample and only the eigenvalues bigger than those found in the random data 
are retained (Wood et al., 2015). This allows researchers to be more confident in their 
interpretation of the complete EFA results. In Figure 4 below, a scree plot shows a visual 
representation of the parallel analysis. The ideal factor number is identified by measuring the 
point where the actual data line intersects with the simulated data line, which in this case 
was two or three, again contradicting the idea that the MFQ scale is measuring five factors.  
 
 
Figure 4. Plot of factor parallel analysis 
Principal axis factoring was then combined with an oblique rotation method to extract 
the factors. This was executed on eight factors. Principal axis factoring is the crux of the EFA 
process and seeks to identify the least number of factors capable of accounting for the 
variance of the variables involved. An oblique rotation method was chosen because it does 
not assume factor correlations of zero, which an orthogonal rotation does (Brown, 2009). As 
can be seen in the below Table 4, the relationships predicted by MFT are visible. For 
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example, the Harm and Fairness foundations are more often grouped or alone than grouped 
with the binding foundations. Harm, Fairness and Authority were the most consistent, with 
five out of six Harm items loading onto Factor2, five out of six Fairness items loading onto 
Factor5, and five out of six Authority items loading onto Factor1. The most concerning 
aspect of this EFA is the number of items loading onto multiple factors e.g. pur1 loading onto 
Factors 6, 1, and 4 at above >.20. Loading >0.3 is generally considered as substantial cross-
loading in the literature (Yong & Pearce, 2013). This could indicate that some of the MFQ 
items are not accessing a single foundation, or they are not being interpreted by participants 
the way MFQ researchers theorise. Alternatively, the cross loading may suggest that there is a 
higher order structure to the data, potentially explained by the individualising-binding higher 
order factor grouping. Below, in Table 4, is the output from the first EFA. For ease of 
reading, factor loadings above 0.2 have been highlighted.  
 
Table 4 
EFA Factor Loadings for all MFQ Items 
Item Factor 
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Factor8 
Harm1 0.07 0.69 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 0.03 -0.03 
Harm2 -0.06 0.62 0.06 -0.04 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.02 
Harm3 -0.04 0.38 0.07 0.32 0.03 -0.10 -0.33 -0.07 
Harm4 -0.01 0.71 -0.07 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.03 
Harm5 -0.01 0.26 -0.07 0.27 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.18 
Harm6 0.06 0.13 -0.08 0.03 0.32 0.12 0.31 -0.12 
Fair1 0.10 0.25 -0.01 -0.05 0.48 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 
Fair2 0.04 0.14 0.14 -0.02 0.36 0.06 -0.45 -0.15 
Fair3 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.51 0.01 -0.13 -0.13 
Fair4 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.69 0.04 0.07 0.09 
Fair5 0.07 -0.04 -0.10 0.14 0.36 0.09 -0.13 0.31 
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Fair6 -0.11 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.13 -0.05 0.36 -0.25 
Ing1 0.31 0.10 0.24 -0.09 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.32 
Ing2 0.01 -0.05 0.70 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 
Ing3 0.06 0.02 0.68 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.05 
Ing4 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.47 
Ing5 0.01 0.09 0.40 -0.06 0.02 0.17 0.26 0.13 
Ing6 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.09 
Aut1 0.74 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Aut2 0.27 0.05 0.24 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.00 
Aut3 0.42 -0.03 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.01 -0.04 
Aut4 0.55 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 -0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.19 
Aut5 -0.03 -0.03 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.40 -0.09 0.15 
Aut6 0.32 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 -0.10 0.03 0.02 0.20 
Pur1 0.37 0.08 0.04 0.20 -0.03 0.28 -0.09 -0.13 
Pur2 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.78 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 
Pur3 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.68 -0.04 -0.01 
Pur4 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.57 0.04 0.27 0.15 0.06 
Pur5 -0.06 -0.03 0.16 0.23 -0.08 0.48 0.06 0.07 
Pur6 0.14 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.65 0.03 -0.02 
 
  
Below is the output when the EFA was constrained to five factors. This was done to 
discover whether the items would be clustered into the existing five foundation factors or 
whether the individualising items would be clustered separately from the binding items. The 
analysis revealed that this would indeed be sufficient, but again it did not nestle into the five 
factors predicted by MFT. What is clear here though, is that more grouping between the 
individualising and binding foundations is occurring. Ingroup and Authority items are 
particularly noticeable as they are all loading onto Factor3. Additionally, all the Harm and 





EFA factor loadings constrained to five factors 
 
Factor 
Item Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 
Harm1 -.010 0.65 0.05 0.08 0.00 
Harm2 -0.03 0.62 0.05 0.08 0.01 
Harm3 0.13 0.34 -0.02 0.51 0.11 
Harm4 0.l0 0.72 -0.05 -0.10 0.04 
Harm5 0.14 0.22 -0.05 0.07 0.06 
Harm6 0.22 0.17 -0.13 -0.26 0.28 
Fair1 -0.10 0.21 0.02 0.53 0.03 
Fair2 -0.05 0.13 0.11 0.34 0.43 
Fair3 -0.10 -0.01 0.09 0.16 0.59 
Fair4 0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.19 0.67 
Fair5 0.21 -0.08 0.11 -0.07 0.32 
Fair6 0.06 0.24 -0.18 -0.08 0.11 
Ing1 -0.02 0.06 0.62 -0.20 0.00 
Ing2 -0.04 0.00 0.57 0.21 0.05 
Ing3 -0.03 0.05 0.64 0.16 0.03 
Ing4 0.01 -0.05 0.48 -0.15 -0.01 
Ing5 0.06 0.14 0.42 -0.22 -0.04 
Ing6 0.22 0.02 0.22 -0.19 0.01 
Aut1 0.23 -0.04 0.52 0.01 0.05 
Aut2 0.23 -0.04 0.40 0.01 0.03 
Aut3 0.25 -0.05 0.36 0.07 0.16 
Aut4 0.32 -0.06 0.43 -0.05 -0.18 
Aut5 0.28 0.00 0.23 -0.06 -0.18 
Aut6 0.09 -0.08 0.41 -0.09 -0.11 
Pur1 0.48 0.08 0.22 0.12 0.01 
Pur2 0.61 -0.02 0.01 0.38 0.05 
Pur3 0.51 0.11 0.10 -0.18 0.00 
Pur4 0.77 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Pur5 0.53 0.03 0.13 -0.08 -0.12 





Perhaps most interesting from the EFA results was that when the analysis was 
constrained to two factors, it maps almost perfectly onto what would be predicted by the 





EFA factor loadings constrained to two factors 
 
Factor 
Item Factor1 Factor2 
Harm1 -0.01 0.57 
Harm2 0.04 0.56 
Harm3 0.05 0.58 
Harm4 0.10 0.58 
Harm5 0.08 0.27 
Harm6 0.10 0.28 
Fair1 -0.08 0.65 
Fair2 0.01 0.62 
Fair3 -0.05 0.55 
Fair4 0.00 0.47 
Fair5 0.27 0.18 
Fair6 -0.09 0.27 
Ing1 0.54 -0.04 
Ing2 0.43 0.l13 
Ing3 0.50 0.12 
Ing4 0.44 -0.11 
Ing5 0.44 -0.01 
Ing6 0.40 -0.05 
Aut1 0.65 0.01 
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Aut2 0.54 0.00 
Aut3 0.52 0.13 
Aut4 0.66 -0.11 
Aut5 0.46 -0.18 
Aut6 0.44 -0.21 
Pur1 0.60 0.15 
Pur2 0.48 0.21 
Pur3 0.54 0.03 
Pur4 0.64 0.04 
Pur5 0.58 -0.09 
Pur6 0.56 -0.03 
 
 
Exploratory Case Based Analysis 
As an additional exploratory analysis, a case-based method was used to directly assess how 
many participants conform to the moral foundations hypothesis. Case-based methods allow 
us to examine whether individuals conform to a specific pattern set in line with a hypothesis. 
In this sense, it is an idiographic approach i.e. a research perspective that emphasises the 
individual (De Luca Picione, 2015). Each participant entry is a case to be studied. Most 
associated with case-based analyses are single case studies in the clinical literature, which 
deeply investigate an individual and result in mainly subjective inferences (Blampied, 2000). 
The method used in the current study differs from this as it does not simply involve one 
individual, it is assessing a larger population individual by individual. Data are displayed 
graphically, and the methods rely on replication for claims of generalisability or causal 
inference (Blampied, 2000). One of the most valuable characteristics of case-based analysis is 
the ability to treat participants as individuals and how they relate to the research hypotheses, 
rather than merely viewing group level trends and relationships. It is appropriate to use this 
method as the moral foundations hypothesis makes claims on an individual level i.e. that a 
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person will score in a specific pattern on the MFQ depending on what their political attitudes 
are. 
Separate analyses were run on liberal participants (those scoring five or higher on the 
liberalness scale) and on conservatives (those scoring three or lower on the liberalness scale). 
A specific way of running the case-based analysis was not pre-registered, but this was 
deemed the most appropriate as it allows for an easy comparison of both political groups. The 
following rule was used to indicate what pattern of foundation scores the MFH would predict 
for liberal participants: any participant who scores higher on both Harm and Fairness than the 
other three foundations of Ingroup, Authority and Purity. This was then tested on both liberal 
and conservative participants to see how many of each group displayed the predicted pattern. 
If a participant conformed to this rule, we could say that they fit the expected scoring pattern 
for someone with liberal political attitudes. The results of the analysis revealed 511 out of 
672 (76.1%) liberal participants conformed to the rule, while 46 out of 141 conservatives 
conformed to the rule (32.6%). This result lends tentative support to the predictions of the 
study and the MFH. Those scoring in the liberal range of political identity were more likely 
to score higher on the individualising foundations than on the binding foundations. See 





















Liberal Moderate Conservative 




141 n = 387 
n = 511 
(76%) n = 160 









Interpretation of Results 
The following section will dissect the results of each section of the analysis. For 
context, the study hypotheses specified that those participants who scored higher on the scale 
of liberalness (identifying as more politically liberal) should score higher on the MFQ items 
associated with the moral foundations of Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity than those 
items associated with the foundations of Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Subversion, and 
Purity/Sanctity. Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity represent the individualising 
foundations, while the latter three represent the binding foundations. This pattern of results 
would be in line with the predictions of the moral foundations hypothesis. The predictions 
also stated that those scoring lower on the scale of liberalness (identifying as more politically 
conservative) will score higher than liberals on the MFQ items associated with the moral 
foundations of Ingroup, Authority, and Purity, the binding foundations. These predictions 
were to be assessed based on whether the confirmatory models reached acceptable levels of 
fit, and if the regression estimates in the structural equation model were in the hypothesised 
direction. Addressing the first condition, only one of the fit index thresholds were met, so in 
this case the study prediction was not supported. Despite this, the regression estimates in the 
SEM were in the hypothesised direction, such that liberalness had a positive relationship with 
the Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity latent variables, while simultaneously had a negative 
relationship with Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Subversion, and Purity/Sanctity. Specifically, 
those scoring higher in liberalness were more likely to score higher on the individualising 
foundations, while those scoring lower on liberalness were more likely to score higher on the 
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binding foundations. Below, each of the results will be discussed to better inform these 
conclusions. 
Important to note first are the univariate descriptive statistics, in the form of histogram 
plots of scoring on each of the five moral foundations. As was noted in the results section, the 
plots were in line with  previous studies involving liberal and conservative participants. Most 
interesting are the normal distribution of the binding foundations. Previous research would 
predict that these distributions should be weighted more towards the lower scoring end, due 
to the large number of liberals in the sample (Graham et al., 2018). There were also far fewer 
participants scoring in the high ranges of the binding foundations (e.g. 5 or 6) which could 
indicate that very few participants were overtly concerned with the content of the items 
corresponding to these foundations, as opposed to the larger number in the high ranges of the 
individualising foundations. This higher scoring in the individualising foundations is 
predicted by previous research, as most liberals and conservatives are concerned with issues 
of Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity (Graham et al., 2018).  Notable is the much higher 
number of participants identifying as political liberal compared to previous studies, which 
could also be a reason for this pattern of scores. Despite not being ideal, since the dataset was 
drawn from a very large population, this demographic imbalance is not as much of a concern 
as it would be with a smaller sample e.g. <50, as there are ample data points to draw on for 
each group.  
The exploratory correlational analysis revealed tentative support for both predictions, 
in that, those scoring higher on liberalness tended to score higher on the individualising 
foundation, while those scoring lower on liberalness scored higher on the binding 
foundations. Notable, were the weak positive correlations between liberalness and the 
individualising foundations. The weak level of these relationships does actually conform to 
previous research discussed in the literature review (Graham et al., 2018). Both conservatives 
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and liberals care about issues of Harm/Care and Fairness/Cheating, liberals however care 
about them the most. However, there is a much larger portion of liberals than conservatives in 
this dataset so it could be looked at another way, as perhaps an indication that the liberal-
individualising association is not as strong as previously thought. Importantly, the association 
is still statistically significant with a large sample size. The associations predicted for 
conservative participants were supported in much stronger fashion. Moderate negative 
relationships were present between liberalness and the three binding foundations. The 
strongest association came between liberalness and purity (-.31), indicating that more 
conservative participants were much more likely to score higher on the purity foundation. 
This conforms to much of the research in moral psychology, with the association between 
conservatism and concerns about purity and spiritual sanctity having a solid base of empirical 
support (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2018). A specific example comes 
from Inbar, Pizzaro, Knobe and Bloom (2009), in which participants with higher disgust 
sensitivity, associated strongly with high scores on the Purity/Sanctity foundation, were much 
more likely to identity as politically conservative. Additionally, the higher the disgust 
sensitivity, the more likely participants were to be opposed to homosexuality. Finally, there 
were weak-moderate associations between gender and the foundations of Harm, Fairness, and 
Purity. The higher scoring of females on these three foundations was a completely 
unexpected result. Most intriguing was the strength of the regression estimates found in the 
SEM in the current study. Female gender was moderately positively associated with Harm, 
Fairness, Authority and Purity, while weakly negatively associated with Ingroup. This could 
indicate that females are either more concerned than males with issues involving these moral 
foundations or simply that they have a more pronounced reaction to the items in the MFQ.  
The confirmatory models were the main analysis strategy used in the current study to 
test the researcher’s predictions. When undertaking analysis using structural equation 
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modelling, a hypothesised model is created and in turn evaluated based on the assessment of 
its fit to a set of data. This study has committed to the use of fit thresholds defined in the 
preregistration, so to maintain consistency they have all been reported and used to assess the 
results.  
Now we can turn to the results of the CFA and SEM themselves, beginning with the 
CFA. As mentioned in the results section, the CFA did not reach acceptable levels of fit on 
any of the reported fit indices. Part of the study predictions included the confirmatory models 
reaching acceptable fit thresholds, so in this case, the prediction was not supported. Each 
moral foundation from moral foundations theory (MFT) is represented by a latent variable in 
the CFA and SEM. In turn, each latent variable has six items from the moral foundations 
questionnaire (MFQ) that are predicted to be associated with each particular latent variable 
more than the others. Looking directly at the parameter estimate, each of the latent variables 
had consistently strong association with the corresponding items. Only one item, Fair5, 
“justice is the most important requirement for a society,” had an estimate below 0.4. The high 
estimates, coupled with narrow confidence intervals, means we can increase our level of 
certainty that each of the items are loading onto the predicted factor. Perhaps the most 
interesting results from the CFA were the covariances between foundations. Predicted 
relationships occurred based on past MFT research, such that the individualising foundations 
were most strongly associated with each other, as were the binding foundations. Additionally, 
the variables that were predicted to not be strongly associated with each other were not. 
Demonstrating this, Harm/Care and Ingroup/Loyalty had weak positive covariance and this 
suggests that these two foundations were less closely related than other foundation pairs. 
Despite these parameter estimates, as the model did not reach all of the fit index thresholds, 
the dataset cannot be said to fit this model and therefore the study predictions were not 
supported. It is important to note that this CFA only addressed the factor loading stage of the 
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model, so for more conclusive assessment of the study prediction, we need to next look at the 
full structural equation model (SEM). 
Inconsistency in fit indices occurred in the SEM analysis, in that the model converged 
successfully, but only reached the acceptable threshold on the RMSEA index, and not on the 
CFI or TLI. Consistent with the CFA results, high beta estimates with narrow confidence 
intervals indicated strong support for the association between the foundation items and their 
corresponding foundation/latent variable. Confidence interval width is a function of the 
sample size and variance i.e. narrow confidence intervals are the result of a large sample size 
and low variance. As would be expected based on previous research (Graham et al., 2018), 
the strongest regression estimate came from the negative relationship between liberalness and 
Purity/Sanctity. The Purity/Sanctity foundation has consistently elicited the most reaction, in 
the form of higher scores, from participants in similar studies using moral scenarios (Inbar, 
Pizzaro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2010). However, contrary to 
some previous studies (Graham et al., 2009; 2018), the regression estimates of liberalness and 
Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity were much weaker. The implication of this is most 
likely that all participants care about Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity, regardless of 
political identity, but also certain participants care about the other three foundations. Most 
surprising from the SEM results are the moderate positive regressions estimates of gender 
and the latent variables of Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Authority/Subversion, and 
Purity/Sanctity, and the weak negative regression estimate of gender and Ingroup/Loyalty. 
These indicate that females were more likely to score higher on the first four mentioned 
foundations, and lower on the fifth.  
While not being part of the pre-registered confirmatory analyses, the exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) presents some of the most informative results of this study. It must be 
stressed that these results are tentative due to this exploratory status. The most important 
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finding from the EFA is that the items do not load onto the predicted five factors of moral 
foundations theory. The parallel analysis itself suggested eight factors, while the scree plot 
suggested either two or three. This means that the five factors that would be anticipated based 
on the five foundations of MFT did not immediately reveal themselves. As eight factors were 
produced, it is important to unpack this further and attempt to understand why this loading 
pattern may have occurred. Three of the eight factors were simple to interpret, with Factor 1 
clearly representing the Authority/Subversion foundations, Factor 2 representing Harm/Care, 
and Factor 5 representing Fairness/Reciprocity. The others are less clear. Factor 3 had four 
out of six Ingroup/Loyalty items loading onto it, while Factor 6 had four out of six 
Purity/Sanctity items loading onto it, so these two are the most likely candidate for the other 
two foundations. Factor 7 and 8 both had an inconsistent mixture of loadings. Most intriguing 
was Factor 4 which had multiple Purity/Sanctity and Harm/Care items loading onto it. This 
could indicate some crossover between the items associated with these foundations.  
When the analysis was constrained to force the extraction of only five factors, the 
items did generally load onto the hypothesised foundation structure. As noted in the results, 
this was still not a perfect match for the five foundations. However, as the foundations are 
associated in the individualising and binding groups, cross-loading is not entirely unexpected. 
The most revealing results came when the analysis was constrained to two factors, such that 
the individualising and binding foundation grouping nested within two factors. In simple 
terms, when we look at Table 6, if we consider factor one as the binding foundations, and 
factor two as the individualising foundations, almost all 30 items loaded onto the predicted 
factor. This then potentially means that this dataset is more suited to a two-factor model, 
individualising and binding, reminiscent of the early stages of moral foundations theory 
(Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007). This indicates that a future SEM could use 
individualising and binding as two higher order latent variables with the five foundations as 
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separate lower order latent variables. Perhaps the most important takeaway from the EFA is 
that, with the participants in this dataset, there is some evidence for distinct foundations 
within the individualising and binding groupings, while also evidence for similarities within 
these groups. The cross-loading seen demonstrates this potential underlying similarity. As the 
EFA initially identified eight factors within the dataset, this is further evidence of the 
similarity between the foundations. Future research is required to assess whether there is 
potential for expanding the number of foundations into an eight-factor model. This could be 
assessed with a factor analysis on a different dataset. As mentioned in the chapter 2 of the 
literature review, there are multiple other foundations being considered for inclusion in the 
MFT (liberty/oppression, equity/undeservingness, and honesty/lying Graham, et al., 2018), so 
there is potential that the participants in the current study were concerned with these 
foundations. 
Finally, the last statistical technique used in the current study was a case-based 
analysis. The results of this analysis did reveal tentative support to the predictions of the 
study. To recap on the method used, a specific rule was set out by the researchers and applied 
to each participant involved, to determine exactly how many individual participants answered 
the MFQ in line with what would be predicted by the MFH for liberal participants. The rule 
identified any participant that scored higher on the individualising foundations of Harm/Care 
and Fairness/Reciprocity than the other three binding foundations. The results indicated that 
over twice the percentage of liberals in the study conformed to the rule than did 
conservatives, such that those scoring in the liberal range of political identity were much 
more likely to score higher on the individualising foundations than the binding foundations. 





There are several practical implications we can draw from these results. First, in terms 
of the wider theoretical base of moral foundations theory (MFT) and the moral foundations 
hypothesis (MFH), this study presents empirical evidence against the predictions made by 
the MFH, albeit tentative due to the inconsistent fit of the confirmatory models. There is 
evidence for inferring that when looking at online datasets of U.S participants specifically, 
the moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ) and the MFT descriptive model of morality, in 
the form used in the current study, may be insufficient for making predictions about 
individual participants moral beliefs. It certainly does demonstrate a difference between 
those identifying as liberal and those identifying as conservative, however, when looking at 
the regression estimates. In a more real-world context, the demarcation between political 
sides demonstrates how the disconnect can occur between each sides inability to understand 
the others point of view/reasons for their moral positions (Graham et al., 2009). Often 
liberals justify their decisions more on the consequences for individuals and maximising 
social utility (Graham et al., 2009), while conservatives are more inclined to support rules set 
by previous generations, authority systems, or in a religious context by god (Muller, 1997). 
Both sides have a complex and nuanced morality and the results of this study further indicate 
the need to acknowledge this in order to gain a better understanding of the different political 
sides of the population. Important to remember is that the five foundations of MFT are 
merely a taxonomy to aid in the description of an individual’s morality, not an absolute 
definition. 
A second practical implication of the current study comes from the exploratory factor 
analysis. The items of the MFQ nestled much more effectively in a two-factor model, than 
that of the five predicted by MFT. These two factors in turn mapped almost perfectly onto 
the individualising and binding foundation groups. This indicates that perhaps, for certain 
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populations, in this case an online dataset, a two factor model is more appropriate and may 
yield more insightful predictions about moral profiles of individuals favouring the 
individualising foundations vs binding, rather than unnecessarily increasing model 
complexity such as with a five factor model. It also indicates that, rather than being specific 
to this population, the MFQ is not accessing five different factors, but only two. This would 
have more deeper implication for the wider research area and could warrant further 
investigation. Important to note is that the factor structure of the MFT has been tested by 
multiple other research teams (Davis et al., 2014; Yilmaz et al., 2016) and validated at five 
factors, so further research is required.  
Finally, the study of political attitudes and moral beliefs could have potential in 
influencing public policy decisions, changing the way public political debate is engaged in, 
or even merely increasing compassion among populations. While a replication, such as the 
current study, does not introduce any revolutionary ideas to the public discourse, it aids in 
the progression of understanding morality and the different perspective individuals bring to 
public debate.  
 
Limitations of the Current Study 
The current study has several limitations that will now be addressed. First, the dataset 
from this study was gathered in 2009/2010 so it is questionable whether this is still 
representative of the wider public, and therefore limits generalisability of the results. There is 
a considerable amount of research in personality psychology indicating both the stability of 
traits over time and the potential for malleability, so there is no concrete answer to assuage 




While limiting the dataset to participants from the U.S was intentional to be consistent 
with the original study by Graham et al. (2009), this presents a problem for the 
generalisability of the research. The U.S has a very distinct political landscape; marked by a 
dichotomy between the left and the right of the political spectrum. While this is common in 
Western democracies, it is not representative of the rest of the world; however, no explicit 
generalisability claims have been made by the current study. Fortunately, the original 
myPersonality.org data does include datasets from many other countries so future research 
can overcome this limitation. 
Another limitation with the dataset specifically comes in the form of self-selection 
bias. Participants chose to be involved in the gathering of this data, volunteering through 
myPersonality.org to take the MFQ. This again could limit the external 
validity/generalisability of the results as it is not a representative sample of the wider 
population, many of whom may have no interest in volunteering for scientific inquiry. A 
possible solution to this would be to incorporate a five-factor model of personality measuring 
participants on the Big-5 traits of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, 
and neuroticism (Costa and McCrae, 1988), in order to compare the traits of study 
participants with a control group from the wider population. This would improve the ability 
to make generalised predictions. 
This study used a previously gathered dataset from other researchers across the globe. 
This disconnection from the data-gathering process presents problems with culpability for the 
use of the data and limits feasibility of checking any problems with the dataset itself. In terms 
of the culpability, as the data was not gathered by the researchers of the current study 
directly, it allows for distancing themselves from the data if the results don’t go to plan. All 
aspects of the dataset are predetermined when using an existing dataset; this means the 
researchers don’t have control over the quality of the data, how variables were measured and 
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recorded, confounding variables may not have been recorded, or even which population was 
being studied (Cheng & Phillips, 2014). With the current study, the original researchers, 
including supervisor of the current study Dr. Peter R. Cannon, were diligent in their 
collection, making the dataset easy to access and use. However, a labelling error in the final 
dataset meant that the current analysis had to be rerun once corrected, delaying the results by 
multiple months. Fortunately, as this was fixed, it had no impact on the results.  
There is a potential argument to be made that these results could be exclusive to a 
sample gathered through the social networking site facebook.com. Facebook has great 
potential, due to its ability to reach billions of diverse users, however there are drawbacks to 
its use. There is a lack of ethical guidelines for the use of Facebook, and indeed other social 
media platforms, as a research tool (Kosinski, Matz, Gosliong, Popov, & Stillwell, 2015). 
Participants may be unaware that their data is being used much more widely than they 
anticipated. Deidentification takes a large step to assuaging these concerns, however it should 
still be made explicit to participants what exactly will be done with their data in the future. 
Recently, Facebook themselves have made changes to their data privacy strategies, which 
will make it more difficult for researchers to harvest data within the application (Facebook, 
2018). Time will tell whether this impacts future research projects. 
In terms of the results themselves, there were multiple analyses used that were not 
preregistered: the exploratory correlational analysis and the exploratory factor analysis. 
Additionally, the inferential criteria for the case-based analysis were not preregistered in 
much detail so they were decided post-hoc. This presents concern as it allows for leeway in 
deciding which results to report and analyse. For this reason, the results from these analyses 
must always be considered tentative. This has been made clear multiple times throughout the 
results and discussion. 
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A final note is the limitations of using fit index thresholds. Due to the inconsistency in 
the fit scores, there is a window for post-hoc rationalising of these scores in order for the 
researcher to present their most ideal results instead of the objective results. Many theorists 
consider cut-offs as aids to interpretation, rather than stringent thresholds that must govern 
whether a model fits (Fan & Sivo, 2005; Marsh, Hau, & Grayson, 2005; Yuan, 2005). They 
see researchers as too often overinterpreting cut-off values, as opposed to considering the 
entire model/data relationship. Labelling fit as good or bad is a qualitative interpretation, not 
a mathematical absolute (Lai & Green, 2016). Mueller and Hancock (2010) note that 
inconsistent fit indices are not uncommon and do not automatically mean the model does not 
fit. Unfortunately, this can create misunderstanding in the literature. Some researchers have 
intentionally reported only the indices reaching the appropriate threshold despite having 
calculated others that don’t (Lai & Green, 2016). Lai and Green (2016) demonstrated, 
through multiple simulated models, and replications of empirical models, that two of the 
common reasons given for inconsistent fit values, weak correlations between observed 
variables and weak correlations concealing miss-fit, are incorrect conclusions. They argue the 
real reasons are much more nuanced. They go on to claim that the difference occurs due to 
the different methods employed by the separate fit indices to evaluate fit and interaction of 
the degrees of freedom of the hypothesised model and the baseline models fit. Conveniently, 
the indices used in this research were the RMSEA and CFI, two of the indices used in the 
current study. The details of their argument are beyond the scope of this discussion, but in 
simple terms, they would claim that it cannot be concluded that the current model is mis-
specified as the alternate indices are acting as they should. Additionally, we could conclude 
that there is not a problem with specification of the model or the data itself. There is no 
absolute standard in SEM to compare fit index scores against (Lai & Green, 2016). Also 
important to note from this explanation, is that even if we had used multiple other fit indices 
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instead of the RMSEA, CFI and TLI, this would not have removed the variation in results. 
This explanation for model misfit, however, can become a post-hoc justification for not 
achieving the desired results in a study. Hence, the use of pre-registering exact fit thresholds 
removes the option for this kind of excuse.   
 
Future Research Directions 
The results of the current study have presented multiple paths for future research. 
Most surprising comes from the association revealed in the correlational and SEM analyses 
between gender and scores on the moral foundations. Gender differences in studies using the 
MFQ have been found before (Davis et al., 2014) but the direct relationship between gender 
and the moral foundations has not yet been thoroughly explored and should be the focus of  a 
future confirmatory study. The second path for future research comes from the weak 
relationships between Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity with liberalness. This is a similar 
finding to the lack of negative association found between conservatism and the 
individualising foundations by Sibley et al. (2014), discussed in Chapter 2. It is possible that 
this association has been overstated in previous research and future studies narrowing the 
focus to this relationship specifically could prove insightful for the research area. Conversely, 
it is also possible that conservatives in this study were lower on measures of conservatism 
than previous studies. If conservative were scoring higher in these foundations, that would 
offset the relationship between liberals and these foundations. This is another potential 
avenue to research further. 
As previously mentioned, the dataset was limited to U.S participants; however, the 
wider dataset this sample was taken from contains an extremely diverse population from 
many different nations. Running the same analysis from the current study on all countries or 
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separating by region could produce some interesting insights into global region differences 
and similarities. Graham et al. (2009) found consistent support for the Moral Foundations 
Hypothesis (MFH) across three regional groups: the U.S (n=695); the U.K (n= 477) and what 
they termed other nations (n= 417), which consisted of participants from multiple other 
countries (the most being from Argentina, n=61, and Canada, n = 44). It would then be 
advantageous for the empirical base of MFT and MFH research to conduct the analysis from 
the current study on the wider sample population, including multiple world regions.  
Finally, there remains the question of causality in studies like the current one. As 
MFT is a descriptive model it does not make a claim as to whether moral beliefs cause an 
individual to have specific political attitudes or vice versa. Any attempt to analyse this is 
beyond the scope of the current study, however it would be a useful avenue to pursue. Social 
Identity Theory could provide insight into this, proposed originally by Tajfel (1978). One of 
the major ideas from social identity theory is that individuals are motivated to divide the 
world into them and us, increasing bonds within their group and viewing out-group members 
negatively. This has been expanded in recent times to the realm of information sharing in the 
digital world. Social media and internet news sources allow individuals to constantly reaffirm 
their groups social and political attitudes, preventing cross-group discussion and 
understanding (Bergstrom and Bak-Coleman, 2019). These views could then become more 
solidified and part of an individual’s core beliefs, potentially pushing them to the extremes of 
either side of an issue. As these political and social views become more entrenched, it may 
impact moral attitudes also, as individuals seek to reinforce their group views. Again, the 
causality direction is difficult to interpret. It also possible that a third confounding variable 
e.g. personality traits, could be the real driver of moral and political concerns. This would 





As we have seen from the above paper, the current study produced inconsistent 
results. To recap, the study predictions stated that the results found by Graham, Haidt, and 
Nosek (2009) would be replicated, in that the predictions made by the moral foundations 
hypothesis would be supported. The predictions were to be considered supported if the 
following conditions were met: both the confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation 
model reach acceptable levels of model fit; the regression estimates for political identity 
predicting foundation scores would be in the hypothesised direction, such that higher scores 
on the scale of liberalness would be associated with higher scores on the individualising 
moral foundations of Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity, while lower scores on the 
liberalness scale would be associated with higher scores on the binding moral foundations of 
Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Subversion and Purity/Sanctity. To summarise each of the 
analyses used: the exploratory correlational analysis and case-based analysis provided 
tentative support to the study predictions; the confirmatory factor analysis and structural 
equation model did not provide support to the study predictions due to the inconsistency in 
model fit; and finally the exploratory factor analysis provided a more nuanced look at the 
factor structure that the moral foundations theory descriptive model is based on. As both the 
models did not conclusively fit the data, we can conclude that the inferential criteria for 
supporting the study predictions were not met, and as such the MFH was not supported with 
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A. Hypotheses - Essential elements 
Description of essential elements 
Describe the (numbered) hypotheses in terms of directional relationships between your 
(manipulated or measured) variables. 
In this study, a very similar model to the one used by Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) in 
study 2 of their article ‘Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral 
foundations,’ will be used on a large data set gathered online from the myPersonality project 
using the moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ) to see whether the effect reproduces and 
conforms to the MFH. *An appendix will include a direct replication of the original data from 
study 2 of Graham et al. (2009) to check the accuracy of their model. Prediction The same 
pattern of results from Graham et al. (2009) will be observed in the new MFQ data i.e. the 
MFH will be supported. Such that, more liberal identity will predict higher scores on the 
individualising foundations i.e. political identity will be negatively correlated with harm and 
fairness; while more conservative identity will predict higher scores on binding foundations 
i.e. political identity will be positively correlated with ingroup, authority and purity. The 
structural equation model used for the analysis will also reach the threshold of good fit for all 
reported fit statistics.  
For interaction effects, describe the expected shape of the interactions. 
N/A 
If you are manipulating a variable, make predictions for successful check variables or explain 




A figure or table may be helpful to describe complex interactions; this facilitates correct 
specification of the ordering of all group means. 
•  
For original research, add rationales or theoretical frameworks for why a certain hypothesis is 
tested. 
Jonathan Haidt, Jesse Graham, and Brian Nosek (2007; 2009; 2012) have produced a 
considerable amount of evidence for what they term the Moral Foundations Hypothesis 
(MFH). This states that individuals identifying as politically liberal hold a distinct moral 
profile to those identifying as politically conservative; conceptualised using the five 
foundations of Moral Foundation Theory. Liberals place higher value (defined by larger 
scores on specific items of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire) on the individualising 
foundations of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, while conservatives score relatively evenly 
across all five foundations; scoring higher than liberals on the three binding foundations of 
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. 
If multiple predictions can be made for the same IV-DV combination, describe what outcome 




B. Methods - Essential elements 
Description of essential elements 
Design 
List, based on your hypotheses from section A: Independent variables with all their levels a. 
whether they are within- or between-participant b. the relationship between them (e.g., 
orthogonal, nested). 
Demographic Variables: Age, State, Sex, Political identity All are between-participant. 
Political identity is the main independent variable, predicting scores on the dependent 
measure (the Moral Foundations Questionnaire). 
List dependent variables, or variables in a correlational design 
Measured variables: Scores on the five foundations of the MFQ (30-item total, 6 items per 
foundation). Responses to items were scored individually as observed variables then each 
item corresponding to a specific foundation of MFT were added to get scores for each 
foundation. Political Identity was assessed on 7-point likert scale anchored by strongly liberal 
and strongly conservative. Coded as: strongly liberal = -3; moderately liberal = -2; slightly 
liberal = -1; neutral/moderate = 0; slightly conservative = 1; moderately conservative = 2; 
strongly conservative = 3. Responses on the MFQ were coded as: Part 1: not at all relevant = 
0; not very relevant = 1; slightly relevant = 2; somewhat relevant = 3; very relevant = 4; 
extremely relevant = 5. Part 2: strongly disagree = 0; moderately disagree = 1; slightly 
disagree = 2; slightly agree = 3; moderately agree = 4; strongly agree = 5. Responses by 
participants on all demographics and on the observed measure have been coded already by 
the original researchers and will be used as they are.  
Third variables acting as covariates or moderators. 
N/A 
Planned Sample 
If applicable, describe pre-selection rules. 
10,319 unique participants who have completed both the MFQ and Big-5 questionnaire. 
Indicate where, from whom and how the data will be collected. 
The sample has already been gathered in previous research through the myPersonality 
application (mypersonality.org). The data is in the possession of the main researcher, 
however has not yet been looked at. 
Justify planned sample size 
A very large sample size such as this will result in much stronger inferences. The analysis 
will be using structural equation modelling so a large sample size is necessary.  
If applicable, you can upload a file related to your power analysis here (e.g., a protocol of 
power analyses from G*Power, a script, a screenshot, etc.). 
No files selected 





Describe anticipated specific data exclusion criteria. For example: a) missing, erroneous, or 
overly consistent responses; b) failing check-tests or suspicion probes; c) demographic 
exclusions; d) data-based outlier criteria; e) method-based outlier criteria (e.g. too short or 
long response times). 
Participants outside the U.S Any I.D with more than one participation (in which case, all 
responses from this I.D are deleted) Response set cutting rule: if every item is answered the 
same the participant will be deleted There are also two catch items in the MFQ: Part 1: 
MATH - “Whether or not someone was good at math.” - This item is not scored; it is 
included both to force people to use the bottom end of the scale, and to catch and cut 
participants who respond with the last 3 response options (Haidt, 2009). Participants will be 
cut in line with this. Part 2: GOOD - “It is better to do good than to do bad.” - Not scored, 
included to force use of top of the scale, and to catch and cut people who respond with first 3 
response options (Haidt, 2009). Participants will be cut in line with this.  
Procedure 
Describe all manipulations, measures, materials and procedures including the order of 
presentation and the method of randomization and blinding (e.g., single or double blind), as 
in a published Methods section. 
This study uses an exisiting dataset so there will be no experiment run. The hypothesis will 
be tested using multiple statistical techniques (SEM, case-based analysis). The only required 
materials are the main researchers computer on which the analysis will be run and the 




Set fail-safe levels of exclusion at which the whole study needs to be stopped, altered, and 
restarted. You may pre-determine what proportion of excluded participants will cause the 
study to be stopped and restarted. 
N/A 
If applicable, you can upload any files related to your methods and procedure here (e.g., a 
paper describing a scale you are using, experimenter instructions, etc.) 
No files selected 
C. Analysis plan - Essential elements 
Confirmatory Analyses 
Describe the analyses that will test the first main prediction from the hypotheses section. 
Include: 
the relevant variables and how they are calculated; 
Demographic Variables: Age, State, Sex, Political identity Measured variables: Scores on the 
five foundations of the MFQ (30-item total, 6 items per foundation) Responses to items were 
scored individually as observed variables then each item corresponding to a specific 
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foundation of MFT were added to get scores for each foundation. Political Identity was 
assessed on 7-point likert scale anchored by strongly liberal and strongly conservative. Coded 
as: strongly liberal = -3; moderately liberal = -2; slightly liberal = -1; neutral/moderate = 0; 
slightly conservative = 1; moderately conservative = 2; strongly conservative = 3. Responses 
on the MFQ were coded as: Part 1: not at all relevant = 0; not very relevant = 1; slightly 
relevant = 2; somewhat relevant = 3; very relevant = 4; extremely relevant = 5. Part 2: 
strongly disagree = 0; moderately disagree = 1; slightly disagree = 2; slightly agree = 3; 
moderately agree = 4; strongly agree = 5. Responses by participants on all demographics and 
on the observed measure have been coded already by the original researchers and will be 
used as they are.  
the statistical technique; 
A latent variable model and standardized regression estimation will be used to assess the 
prediction of the study. Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood (items continuous) 
Method for dealing with missing data - Single imputation Multiple exploratory analysis 
strategies, with varying estimation methods, will be used to assess how well the findings are 
supported across estimators. The following will be used: Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood Weighted Least Squares: this will mean treating the items as ordinal The same 
plots used by Graham et al. (2009) will also be used in this study to improve comparative 
strength. Finally, a case-based analysis will be run to assess the MFH on an individual 
participant level. With this, an exact amount of liberals and conservatives who conform to the 
MFH prediction will be established  
each variable’s role in the technique (e.g., IV, DV, moderator, mediator, covariate); 
DV: scores on the MFQ. IV: Political identity Covariate IV: Age, sex, state 
rationale for each covariate used, if any; 
Three covariates are used to asses whether the predictive strength of the IV exists beyond 
demographic variables. 
if using techniques other than null hypothesis testing (for example, Bayesian statistics), 
describe your criteria and inputs toward making an evidential conclusion, including prior 
values or distributions. 
The MFH will be considered to be supported if both of the following occur: 1. The regression 
estimates for political identity predicting foundation scores are in the hypothesised direction 
(negative for harm and fairness; positive for ingroup, authority, and purity) and of significant 
levels (p&lt;.05). 2. The model reaches the threshold of good fit for all of the following fit 
statistics. Fit statistics to report: Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) - 
Threshold of good fit = &lt; 0.07 Comparative fit index (CFI) - Threshold of good fit = ≥ 
0.95 Non-normed fit index/ tucker-lewis index (NNFI/TLI) - Threshold of good fit = ≥ .95  
 
Final questions 
Has data collection begun for this project? 
Yes, data collection is underway or complete 
If data collection has begun, have you looked at the data? 
No 
The (estimated) start and end dates for this project are 
No response 




















































Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
  
Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the 
following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this 
scale: 
  
      [0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right 
and wrong) 
         [1] = not very relevant 
            [2] = slightly relevant 
             [3] = somewhat relevant 
                [4] = very relevant 
                   [5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I 
judge right and wrong) 
  
______Whether or not someone suffered emotionally 
______Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
______Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
______Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority 
______Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
______Whether or not someone was good at math 
______Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
______Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
______Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
______Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society 
______Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
______Whether or not someone was cruel 
______Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
______Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
______Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 




Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
         [0]                 [1]                 [2]                 [3]                 [4]                 [5] 
       Strongly    Moderately       Slightly       Slightly       Moderately    
 Strongly 
       disagree      disagree       disagree           agree          agree  
      agree 
  
______Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. 
______When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that 
everyone is treated fairly. 
  
______I am proud of my country’s history. 
______Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
______People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed. 
______It is better to do good than to do bad. 
______One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. 
______Justice is the most important requirement for a society. 
______People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something 
wrong.  
______Men and women each have different roles to play in society. 
______I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. 
______It can never be right to kill a human being. 
______ I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor 
children inherit nothing. 
______ It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. 
______ If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey 
anyway because that is my duty. 
  
______ Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
  
  
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (full version, July 2008) by Jesse Graham, Jonathan 
Haidt, and Brian Nosek. 
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For more information about Moral Foundations Theory and scoring this form, see: 
www.MoralFoundations.org 
 
 
